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ARTICLES
BRADY'S BLIND SPOT: IMPEACHMENT
EVIDENCE IN POLICE PERSONNEL FILES
AND THE BATTLE SPLITTING THE
PROSECUTION TEAM
Jonathan Abel*
The Supreme Court's Brady doctrine requires prosecutors to disclose favor-
able, material evidence to the defense, but in some jurisdictions, even well-
meaning prosecutors cannot carry out this obligation when it comes to one criti-
cal area ofevidence: police personnel files. These files contain valuable vidence
ofpolice misconduct hat can be used to attack an officer's credibility on the wit-
ness stand and can make the dfference between acquittal and conviction. But
around the country, state statutes and local policies prevent prosecutors from ac-
cessing these files, much less disclosing the material they contain. And even
where prosecutors can access the misconduct in these files, their ability to dis-
close this information, as required by the Constitution, is constrained by the ef-
forts of police officers and unions who have used litigation, legislation, and in-
formal political pressure to prevent Brady's application to these files.
Suppression of this misconduct evidence can cost defendants their lives, but dis-
closure can also be costly. It can cost officers their livelihoods.
Using interviews with prosecutors, police officials, and defense attorneys
around the country, as well as unpublished and published sources, this Article
provides the first account of the wide disparities in Brady's application to police
personnel fles. It argues that critical impeachment evidence is routinely and sys-
tematically suppressed asa result ofstate laws and local policies that limit access
* Fellow, Stanford Constitutional Law Center. I would like to thank the many people
who agreed to be interviewed for this project. I would also like to thank the following people
who read, commented on, and otherwise helped with this Article: Liora Abel, Stephanie
Bair, Stephanos Bibas, Jud Campbell, Jack Chin, David Freeman Engstrom, Barbara Fried,
Daniel Ho, Cathy Hwang, Thea Johnson, Susannah Karlsson, Dmitry Karshtedt, Amy
Knight, Randy Kozel, Shira Levine, Michael McConnell, Daniel McConkie, Randy Means,
Bernadette Meyler, Mark Middaugh, Sonia Moss, Lisa Ouellette, Richard Primus, Andrea
Roth, Jacob Russell, Stephen Siegel, William Simon, David Sklansky, Thomas Sprankling,
Michael Toth, Chris Walker, Justin Weinstein-Tull, Robert Weisberg, Patricia J. Zettler,
Danielle Zimmerman, and Erik Zimmerman. I am grateful to the editors of the Stanford Law
Review, particularly Mark Storslee and his editing team
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to the personnelfiles and as a result of the conflict within the prosecution team
over Brady's application to these files. Further, the Article challenges Brady s
assumption that prosecutors and police officers form a cohesive "prosecution
team" and that, in the words of the Supreme Court, "the prosecutor has the
means to discharge the government's Brady responsibility if he will" by putting
in place "procedures and regulations" to bring forth information known only to
the police. Finally, the Article contends that privacy protections for police mis-
conduct are incompatible with core aspects of the Brady doctrine and that sys-
tems that attempt o balance Brady against police privacy wind up sacrficing the
former to the latter. As both a doctrinal and a normative matter, police miscon-
duct should receive no protections from Brady's search and disclosure obliga-
tion.
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The Supreme Court decided Brady v. Maryland in 1963,' and it has spent
the past fifty years expanding the doctrine.2 Brady requires prosecutors to dis-
close favorable, material evidence to the defense, including anything known to
the prosecutor or to any member of the prosecution team.3 Recently, Brady vio-
lations have received much attention, with blame focused squarely on prosecu-
tors. Courts have appointed special counsel to investigate Brady-violating pros-
ecutors, threatened criminal proceedings against prosecutors who withhold
Brady material,4 and gone as far as to declare "an epidemic of Brady violations
abroad in the land."5 Prosecutors must "stop playing games with Brady," and
courts must "deal more harshly with prosecutors who don't play fair," accord-
ing to a recent Los Angeles Times editoriali The New York Times editorial
board attacked Brady violations under the heading "Rampant Prosecutorial
Misconduct."7 Meanwhile, the scholarly literature has criticized prosecutors
who "willfully bypass[] the disclosure rules,"8 "intentionally, knowingly, or at
least recklessly withhold potentially exculpatory evidence,"9 and "require the
accused to undertake a scavenger hunt for hidden Brady clues."'0
But there is a critical source of Brady material that even well-meaning
prosecutors are often unable to discover or disclose: evidence of police mis-
conduct contained in police personnel files. These files contain internal affairs
reports, disciplinary write-ups, and performance evaluations, documenting a
range of information that defendants can use to their advantage at trial. In many
cases, these files contain evidence of an officer's dishonesty-evidence that
can be critical to impeaching the officer's testimony. In some jurisdictions, this
evidence of police misconduct is freely available to the public. But in other ju-
1. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
2. See, e.g., Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437-38 (1995).
3. Id
4. United States v. Jones, 620 F. Supp. 2d 163, 166 (D. Mass. 2009); Notice of Filing
of Report to Hon. Emmet G. Sullivan, In re Special Proceedings, No. 09-0198 (EGS)
(D.D.C. Mar. 15, 2012), 2012 WL 858523; Neil A. Lewis, Tables Turned on Prosecution in
Stevens Case, N.Y. TIMEs (Apr. 7, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/08/us/politics
/08stevens.htnlt
5. United States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625, 626 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, C.J., dissent-
ing from denial of rehearing en bane).
6. Editorial, Don't Ignore the Brady Rule: Evidence Must Be Shared, L.A. TIMES
(Dec. 29, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/dec/29/opinion/la-cd-brady-20131229.
7. Editorial, Rampant Prosecutorial Misconduct, N.Y. TIMEs (Jan. 4, 2014), http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/01/05/opinion/sunday/rampant-prosecutorial-misconduct.htn].
8. Daniel S. Medwed, Brady's Bunch of Flaws, 67 WAsH. & LEE L. REV. 1533, 1540
(2010).
9. Alafair S. Burke, Talking About Prosecutors, 31 CARDOZo L. REjv. 2119, 2128
(2010) (summarizing "the traditional Brady literature").
10. Bennett L. Gershman, Bad Faith Exception to Prosecutorial Immunity for Brady




risdictions, state laws and local policies make this information so confidential
that not even the prosecutor can access the files without a court order. These
restrictions on access, in turn, result in the routine and systematic suppression
of Brady material. While the U.S. Supreme Court's constitutional interpreta-
tions are supposed to govern all criminal trials, the reality is that Brady's due
process demands are applied in dramatically different ways depending on
where the defendant is tried.
Brady's application to police personnel files has grave implications for de-
fendants and police officers. For defendants, the impeachment material in these
files can mean the difference between life and death. Misconduct findings are
so valuable because they are the police department's own assessment of the of-
ficer's credibility. A report in one case found that a detective's "image of hon-
esty, competency, and overall reliability must be questioned."" Records in an-
other revealed a detective's repeated lies to internal affairs investigators, a
psychological assessment that the detective "should not be entrusted with a gun
and badge," and a warning to the police department from the office of the state
attorney general: "If you had a homicide tonight. . ., I would instruct you that
[the detective] not be involved in the case in any capacity."1 2 Findings from
other cases excoriated officers for making false overtime claims, filing false
police reports,14 and stealing from the police department. 15 When this miscon-
duct has come out, sometimes decades after trial, murder convictions have been
overturned and people have been released from death row.16
Meanwhile, for officers, Brady's application to their files jeopardizes not
their lives but their livelihoods. Officers whose credibility is called into ques-
tion by police misconduct may not be able to testify in future cases. And offic-
ers who cannot testify-so-called "Brady cops"-cannot make arrests, investi-
gate cases, or conduct any other police work that might lead to the witness
stand. Such officers would be well advised to start looking for a new profes-
sion. Making matters worse, officers fear that prosecutors and police chiefs will
abuse the Brady-designation system by labeling officers as Brady cops in order
to punish them outside the formal channels of the police disciplinary system
and all its procedural protections. For the officers, then, Brady is a matter not
only of defendants' due process rights but also of their own due process rights.
To protect their interests, officers and police unions have pushed back on
11. Milke v. Ryan, 711 F.3d 998, 1012 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation mark omit-
ted).
12. State v. Laurie, 653 A.2d 549, 553 (N.H. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted).
13. Fields v. State, 69 A.3d 1104, 1110 (Md. 2013).
14. Miller v. City of Ithaca, 914 F. Supp. 2d 242, 247 (N.D.N.Y. 2012).
15. United States v. Robinson, 627 F.3d 941, 946 (4th Cir. 2010); see also Problem
Officers., What They Did to End Up on List, SEATTLE TIMES (June 24, 2007, 12:00 AM),
http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2003760492_bradylist24m.html; Spokane Officer
Suspended for Link with Prostitute, KJHQ (May 20, 2013, 11:08 AM PDT), http://www.khq
.com/story/22299873/straubreleasesstatementaboutofficer.
16. Eg., Milke, 711 F.3d at 1001, 1019; Laurie, 653 A.2d at 554.
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Brady's application to police files, launching a campaign of litigation, legisla-
tion, and informal political pressure aimed at prosecutors and police chiefs.tI
This conflict over Brady's application has split the prosecution team, pitting
prosecutors against police officers and police management against police labor.
Despite the high stakes of applying Brady to police personnel files-or,
perhaps, because of them-there is no nationwide consensus on how to ap-
proach this issue. Wide variations in Brady's application to these files stem
from a multiplicity of state laws and local policies protecting personnel files, as
well as from differences in the institutional dynamics between and within pros-
ecutors' offices and police departments.
Using interviews with prosecutors, police officials, and defense attorneys
around the country, as well as unpublished and published sources, this Article
provides the first account of the wide disparities in Brady's application to po-
lice personnel files. It argues that critical impeachment evidence is routinely
and systematically suppressed as a result of state laws and local policies that
limit access to the personnel files. Beyond these policies, Brady's application to
the files is further impeded by the conflict within the prosecution team. Brady
assumes that prosecutors and police officers form a cohesive "prosecution
team" and that, in the words of the Supreme Court, "the prosecutor has the
means to discharge the government's Brady responsibility if he will" by putting
in place "procedures and regulations" to bring forth information known only to
the police. 8 But when it comes to Brady's application to these personnel files,
the prosecution team is at war with itself, and this internal battle makes the
concept of the prosecution team fall apart. Finally, the Article contends that
privacy protections for police misconduct are incompatible with core aspects of
the Brady doctrine and that systems that attempt to balance Brady against po-
lice privacy wind up sacrificing the former to the latter. The Article argues that,
as both a doctrinal and a normative matter, police misconduct should receive no
protections from Brady's search and disclosure obligation, and that, because the
blame for Brady violations goes far beyond the prosecutor's office, so must the
solutions. 19
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I looks at how the Supreme Court's
Brady doctrine applies to police personnel files and at the doctrinal ambiguities
the federal courts have failed to resolve.
17. See infra Part III.B.
18. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 438 (1995) (quoting Giglio v. United States, 405
U.S. 150, 154 (1972)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
19. Oft-advocated reforms-giving bite to prosecutors' ethical guidelines, humiliating
withholding prosecutors, and providing defendants access to prosecutors' files-would be
little help with this issue because they target the prosecutor. For examples of reform pro-
posals, see R. Michael Cassidy, Plea Bargaining, Discovery, and the Intractable Problem of
Impeachment Disclosures, 64 VAND. L. REv, 1429, 1460 (2011); Cynthia E. Jones, A Reason
to Doubt: The Suppression of Evidence and the Inference of Innocence, 100 1. CRM. L. &
CRMINOLoGY 415, 436-39 (2010) (surveying a range of proposed Brady reforms); and Rich-
ard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A Paper
Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REv. 693, 708-14 (1987).
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Parts II and Ii discuss how the states have applied Brady to these files.
Part II examines how varying state laws and local policies affect Brady compli-
ance. The discussion provides a novel framework that divides jurisdictions into
four groups: (1) those where prosecutors cannot access the personnel files;
(2) those where prosecutors need not access the files because the records of
misconduct are accessible to the public and thus not considered Brady material;
(3) those where prosecutors have access to the files and use that access to
search for and disclose the misconduct information; and (4) those where prose-
cutors have access to the files but do not put systems in place to search for or
disclose the information. Part III contends that, even when prosecutors can dis-
cover and disclose Brady material in the files, they face much pressure from
police officers and unions not to. This conflict within the prosecution team over
Brady's application to the files-a conflict described as the "third rail" of the
prosecutor-police relationship20--has also pitted police brass against police la-
bor. Part III argues that the internal conflict within the prosecution team is a
further impediment to Brady's application to records of police misconduct.
Part IV argues that police misconduct does not deserve the confidentiality
protections it currently enjoys. Even if it did deserve such protections, the sys-
tems that purport to balance Brady against police confidentiality violate core
tenets of the Brady doctrine and make bad public policy by allowing dishonest
officers to continue to testify. Part V argues that he solutions for this Brady
problem must look beyond prosecutors, and even beyond the police. Making
police misconduct more accessible would benefit not only defendants but also
society, ensuring fairer trials and forcing dishonest cops off the job.
I. BRADYIN THE FEDERAL COURTS
The Supreme Court significantly expanded Brady's sweep over the last fif-
ty years, charging prosecutors with the responsibility for learning of and dis-
closing favorable evidence found in an increasingly broad array of sources.
This expansion took place with the Court focused on evidence in the prosecu-
tor's or the police department's case files. But the logic and the language of the
doctrine also dragged along another ex anse of Brady material, sometimes re-
ferred to as "hidden" Brady evidence.31 This Article refers to this "hidden"
Brady material as "unrelated-case" evidence. Such evidence meets the three
criteria of Brady: it is (1) favorable to the defendant, (2) materially so, and
(3) known to a member of the prosecution team. But what makes this evidence
different from traditional Brady material is that it is unrelated to the case: it
came to the prosecution team's attention not through the investigation of the
20. Telephone Interview with Jerry Coleman, Chief, Brady, Appellate & Training
Div., S.F. Dist. Att'y Office (Feb. 12, 2014).
21. Application of Jeffrey F. Rosen, Santa Clara County District Attorney, for Leave
to File Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Petitioner; Amicus Curiae Brief at ii, People v.
Superior Court (Johnson), 176 Cal. Rptr. 3d 340 (Ct. App. 2014) (Nos. Al40767, A140768).
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case at hand but through the team members' involvement in other cases. Police
misconduct evidence generally falls into this "unrelated-case" category.
However, while the Supreme Court's case law draws this material into the
orbit of Brady, the Court never considered the special challenges posed to pros-
ecutors by unrelated-case material. Specifically, the Court's Brady case law has
provided no logical limit on how far the prosecutor must go to learn of and dis-
close material that is unrelated to the case at hand but is still known by some
member of the prosecution team. And while the lower federal courts have fash-
ioned some practical, case-by-case answers to the general question of Brady's
application to unrelated-case material, these guidelines do not settle the ques-
tion of how Brady applies to police personnel files. This gap in the federal case
law, in turn, has allowed the states to go in widely divergent directions on this
issue. But before discussing the state of the federal case law, a short primer is
required.
A. Basics on Brady, Personnel Files, and Impeachment Evidence
Brady requires prosecutors to disclose to defendants any favorable, materi-
al evidence known to any member of the prosecution team, including the po-
lice. A Brady violation has three elements.22 First, the evidence in question
must be favorable to the defendant because it is either exculpatory or impeach-
ing.23 Second, the prosecutor must have suppressed the evidence, either by hid-
ing it or by failing to learn of and disclose it. Good or bad faith on the part of
the prosecutor is irrelevant. Finally, the suppressed evidence must be material
enough that its disclosure would create a "reasonable probability" of a different
outcome as to guilt or punishment.24
This Article focuses on suppression, the second element of a Brady viola-
tion, and particularly on suppression that occurs when prosecutors fail to learn
of something they should have learned of This inquiry necessarily requires a
definition of what the prosecutor should have known. The Supreme Court held,
in a 1.995 decision extending the Brady doctrine, that "the individual prosecutor
has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the
government's behalf in the case, including the police."25 Because officers are
members of the prosecution team, and because they know of the misconduct in
their own files, Brady requires the prosecutor to learn of and disclose this in-
formation. But this duty to learn raises difficult line-drawing questions about
how far the prosecutor must go in scouring the officer's past. The Article ad-
22. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999).
23. Id. Evidence that is impeaching, as opposed to exculpatory, is sometimes called
Giglio material, after the Supreme Court case extending Brady to impeachment evidence.
See Giglio, 405 U.S. 150.
24. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281.
25. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995); see also Youngblood v. West Virgin-
ia, 547 U.S. 867, 869-70 (2006) (per curiam); Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 693 (2004);
Strickler, 527 U.S. at 275 n.12.
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dresses those questions later on. For now, it is important to note that the Arti-
cle's frequent discussion of the prosecutor's duty to learn is geared toward this
second element of a Brady violation: suppression.
A brief discussion of police personnel files is also required.2 These files
contain many forms of Brady material. The Article focuses mostly on im-
peachment evidence in the files-performance evaluations, disciplinary write-
ups, and internal affairs investigations that show an officer has lied. This in-
formation can be critical to a defendant in attacking the officer's credibility on
the stand. Examples include findings that officers falsified reports, provided
false testimony, stole money, or otherwise lied on the job. 27 Even when the ini-
tial misconduct does not implicate the officer's truthfulness, the internal affairs
investigation that follows may do so if the officer is caught in a lie or a cover-
up.
28
In addition, the files may also contain exculpatory, as opposed to im-
peachment, evidence. In one case, for example, internal ffairs findings showed
that a forensic technician's "lab work was characterized by sloppiness and
haste."29 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the findings "could have supported a
defense theory that [the technician] inadvertently contaminated" the evi-
dence.30 Exculpatory evidence may also appear in the files when a police de-
partment launches an internal affairs investigation in parallel to a criminal in-
vestigation and comes across witness statements hat are favorable to the
defense, or when an officer's history of excessive force allows a defendant to
argue that the officer was the aggressor and, thus, that the defendant acted in
self-defense.3 '
The focus of this Article is on impeachment evidence contained in these
files, so the basics of impeachment are worth mentioning. Impeachment evi-
dence is anything that tends to call into question the credibility of a witness.
26. For simplicity's sake, the Article uses "police" as shorthand for "law enforce-
ment." This is not intended to distinguish police from sheriffs' offices or other types of law
enforcement agencies.
27. See, e.g., United States v. Veras, 51 F.3d 1365, 1374 (7th Cir. 1995); State v.
Richard W., 971 A.2d 810, 820-21 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009); City of Hastings v. Law En-
forcement Labor Serys., Inc., BMS Case No. 12-PA-0020, 2012 WL 759075, at *3 (Feb. 13,
2012) (Kapsch, Arb.); Mark Fazlollah, Prolfic Officer's Credibility at Issue, PHILA.
INQUIRER (Apr. 15, 2013), http://articles.philly.com/2013-04-15/news/38531719_1_drug
-arrests-defense-attomeys-public-defender; Problem Officers: What They Did to End Up on
List, supra note 15; Shawn Vestal, Dismissal of Detective Sheds Light on 'Brady Officer,"
SPOKESMAN-REv. (July 23, 2011), http://www.spokesman-com/stories/201 1/jul/23/shawn
-vestal-dismissal-of-detective-sheds-light.
28. See, e.g., Milke v. Ryan, 711 F.3d 998, 1012 (9th Cir. 2013); State v. Laurie, 653
A.2d 549, 552-53 (N.H. 1995).
29. United States v. Olsen, 704 F.3d 1172, 1181 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.
Ct. 2711 (2014).
3 0. Id.
31. E.g., Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Accused's Right to Discovery or Inspection of
Records of Prior Complaints Against, or Similar Personnel Records of Peace Officer In-
volved in the Case, 86 A.L.R.3D 1170, §§ 2[a], 3[c] (West 2015).
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Trial judges have broad discretion in setting limits on the use of impeachment
evidence, and rules differ across the country about how a witness may be im-
peached. In general, as provided by Federal Rule of Evidence 608(a) and its
state-law equivalents, "[a] witness's credibility may be attacked or supported
by testimony about the witness's reputation for having a character for truthful-
ness or untruthfulness, or by testimony in the form of an opinion about that
character."32 The information contained in the personnel files may be critical to
a defendant in alerting her to the officer's credibility problems and may help
her locate people who can testify about the officer's credibility problems.
The documents in the personnel file can also be critical in another form of
impeachment: cross-examination of a witness about specific instances of con-
duct. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b) and its state-law analogues, the
court may allow a witness to be asked about "specific instances of. . . conduct"
on cross-examination provided they are "probative of the character for truthful-
ness or untruthfulness of. . , the witness."33 While the internal affairs findings
themselves will generally not be allowed into evidence,34 defense counsel's
knowledge of these findings allows for questioning of the officer that can de-
molish the officer's credibility. If asked about a specific instance of dishonesty,
the officer will be forced into a cruel trilemma: Admit the misconduct, and
come off as a liar. Deny the misconduct, and commit perjury. Claim no recol-
lection, and have his memory called into question.
In cases that hinge on an officer's testimony, the value of these various
forms of impeachment evidence cannot be overstated. But the evidence is
meaningless if the defendant never learns about it, and that is where Brady
comes in.
B. The Supreme Court
What has the Supreme Court said about Brady's application to police per-
sonnel files? The short answer is that the Court has never been required to de-
cide a case involving Brady's application to these files. What it has said is that
the prosecutor has a duty to learn of favorable information known to any mem-
32. FED. R. EvID. 608(a).
33. Id. 608(b); see also 28 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR J. GOLD, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6111, at 25 (2d ed. 2012) ("Most of the state versions of Rule
608 are identical to the federal provision as originally enacted or make no substantive chang-
es."). Some states, either by rule or by case law, limit questioning on specific instances of
conduct to those that resulted in convictions. E.g., LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 608(B) (2014)
("Particular acts, vices, or courses of conduct of a witness may not be inquired into or proved
by extrinsic evidence for the purpose of attacking his character for truthfulness, other than
conviction of crime as provided in Articles 609 and 609.1 or as constitutionally required.").
But courts have held that even these limitations must sometimes give way if the specific in-
stances are particularly crucial to the defendant's case. See, e.g., State v. Walton, 715 N.E.2d
824, 827 (Ind. 1999).
34. I say "generally" because some states, including Hawaii, do allow extrinsic evi-
dence of specific instances of conduct. See HAW. R. EVID. 608(b).
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ber of the prosecution team, including the police,35 But, as noted earlier, the
question of how far the prosecutor must go in probing the officer's background
is not easily answered by the doctrine. This line-drawing problem has its roots
in the story of how the Supreme Court expanded Brady over the years.
In 1963, the Court announced Brady's due process doctrine, holding that
"the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon
request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment." But the doctrine quickly became more demanding. In the
Court's 1972 decision in Giglio v. United States, Brady was expanded to in-
clude impeachment evidence.37 United States v. Bagley further extended Brady
in 1985, eliminating the requirement that the defendant make a request for the
evidence.38 The elimination of the need for a defense request placed a self-
executing, affirmative obligation on the prosecution to discern and disclose the
evidence, independent of any defense action.39 In 1995, Kyles v. Whitley again
extended Brady, announcing that "the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn
of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's be-
half in the case, including the police."40
As a matter of doctrine and policy, there is much to recommend these ex-
tensions. They helped effectuate the original purpose of Brady: to prevent the
government from suppressing evidence critical to a fair trial. But these expan-
sions also had the effect of making the prosecutor's duty to discover, analyze,
and disclose favorable information much more complicated. The literature has
discussed how this expansion affected the prosecutor's Brady duties.4 1 The
point to emphasize, however, is that Brady's expansion had a much greater ef-
fect on unrelated-case material than it did on case-related material.42
The expansion's effect on case-related material was relatively modest.
"Case-related" material refers to information dredged up in the course of inves-
35. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,437 (1995).
36. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
37. 405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972).
38. 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (plurality opinion); id. at 685 (White, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
39. Id. at 682 (plurality opinion); id. at 685 (White, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment); Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 696 (2004); see 2 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT & PETER J. HENNING, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 256, at 151 (4th ed.
2009) ("The Court reiterated in Banks v. Dretke the requirement that prosecutors have an
independent duty to disclose Brady material that is not conditioned on a defendant's request
for such material...." (footnote omitted)).
40. 514 U.S. at 437.
4L. E.g., Bennett L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. TEx. L. Rcv.
685, 692 (2006).
42. Some commentators, however, question whether Brady's reach has actually ex-
panded. See Scott E. Sundby, Fallen Superheroes and Constitutional Mirages: The Tale of
Brady v. Maryland, 33 McGEORGE L. REv. 643, 645 (2002) ("As Brady's scope has been
expanding to cover a broader range of government behavior and evidence, however, the
Court simultaneously has been contracting the Brady right on another front, that of materiali-
ty.").
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tigating the case-in short, the information in the prosecutor's and police de-
partment's case files. In the cases expanding Brady, the Justices frequently re-
ferred to Brady information as being contained in "the file," by which they
meant the case file. 4 3 But while the case law makes the prosecutor responsible
for everything discovered in the process of investigating the case (i.e., the case-
related material), the expanded Brady doctrine also seems to encompass unre-
lated-case material, provided the material is known to some member of the
prosecution team.44
This creates a difficult line-drawing problem for which Supreme Court
cases provide no definitive answer: How far does the prosecutor's "duty to
learn" extend? On the one hand, the duty to learn of unrelated-case material
could become unmanageable if the prosecutor in each case had to search all the
files in her office-or in the police department-to ensure those files do not
contain any Brady material. Similarly, it would be very difficult if the prosecu-
tor had a duty to learn of impeachment material contained in an officer's di-
vorce proceedings or high school report cards. On the other hand, it is hard to
imagine that the prosecutor could be allowed to turn a blind eye to evidence of
a witness's dishonesty, known to members of the prosecution team, simply be-
cause the evidence was housed in a different case file and was not uncovered in
the course of investigating this particular case. Clearly, the prosecutor's duty to
learn cannot extend infinitely. But just as clearly, it cannot be strictly limited to
case-related information, as such a strict limitation would pennit a police of-
ficer to stay quiet about his knowledge of, say, an informant's history of lying,
so long as those lies were discovered in a separate case.
Not only would a strict line against unrelated-case material clash with the
language and logic of Brady's "duty to learn," but it would also ignore the fact
that three Supreme Court Brady cases involved unrelated-case material. In
43. Supreme Court cases mentioning the Brady files always refer to case-related files.
See, e.g., Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 459 (2009) (discussing, in the Brady context, a crimi-
nal defendant's right to review "the prosecutor's file in his case"); Bagley, 473 U.S. at 695,
702 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that Brady requires the prosecutor to disclose "all evi-
dence in his files that might reasonably be considered favorable to the defendant's case");
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, I11 (1976) ("[W]e have rejected the suggestion that the
prosecutor has a constitutional duty routinely to deliver his entire file to defense coun-
sel . . , ."); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (discussing, in the Brady con-
text, "a combing of the prosecutors' files" (quoting United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138,
148 (2d Cir. 1968)) (internal quotation mark omitted)). The focus on case-related material is
further evidenced by dicta suggesting that open-file policies would be sufficient for Brady
compliance, even though open-file policies-which allow defendants direct access to the
prosecutor's case file-never give the defendant free run of unrelated-case files in the prose-
cutor's office or police department. See, e.g., Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1386
n.27 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 283 n.22 (1999);
Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437; Bagley, 473 U.S. at 699 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
44. Cf Robert Hochman, Comment, Brady v Maryland and the Search for Truth in
Criminal Trials, 63 U. CHI. L. Rrv. 1673, 1677 (1996) ("A search Brady claim arises when
the prosecutor fails to gather, or to receive from others, evidence that might be material and
favorable to the defense.").
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United States v. Agurs, the undisclosed evidence was a murder victim's crimi-
nal record, which was not drawn from the particular case.45 In Kyles v. Whitley,
information about a key informant's criminal conduct was among the evidence
deemed to be Brady material, even though it was unrelated to the case. 46 And
in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, the Court dealt with a defendant's Brady request for
child abuse records "related to the immediate charges" as well as earlier records
stemming from "a separate report" of the defendant's abuse-a report that was
unrelated to the investigation.4 7 The Ritchie Court spent no time distinguishing
between case-related and unrelated-case material, instead remanding the matter
for the state court to conduct an in camera review.4 8 In these three cases, the
Supreme Court never indicated that the evidence's lack of connection to the
case meant that it did not count as Brady evidence. At the same time, the Court
never acknowledged the special challenges this material posed for the prosecu-
tor's duty to team, nor did it articulate where to draw the line on the prosecu-
tor's duty to search unrelated-case material.
Evidence of police misconduct, contained in police personnel files, falls in-
to this doctrinal crack insofar as it is generally not related to any specific case.
But wherever the line is drawn on the prosecutor's duty to learn, the personnel
files would seem to be within the prosecutor's constructive knowledge. Unlike
the far-flung records of officers' divorce proceedings or high school report
cards, the personnel files are official documents relating to the officers' official
duties and found within the possession bf the prosecution team. These factors
mean that the misconduct is not only more likely to be useful to the defendant
at trial-that is, to be favorable, material evidence-but also more likely to be
practicably obtainable, given that the prosecutor need only check a few files to
look for it. In short, on the spectrum of what the prosecutor has a duty to dis-
cover, the police misconduct records are not the borderline case.
Nonetheless, the Court's failure to acknowledge the special problems
posed by this unrelated-case material has created an unfortunate ambiguity
about the extent of the duty to learn. Typically, such ambiguities could be dealt
with by the lower federal courts, but in the case of Brady's application to law
enforcement personnel files, that clarification has not occurred.
C. The Lower Federal Courts
The lower federal courts have fashioned practical, case-by-case rules to de-
fine whether a prosecutor has a duty to learn of unrelated-case material. These
rules ask whether a reasonable prosecutor would have learned of the infor-
mation in light of the following factors: Was the person with actual knowledge
45, 427 U.S. at 100-01, 114; Brief for the United States, Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (No. 75-
491), 1976 WL 181371, at *5-7.
46. 514 U.S. at 428-29,
47. 480 U.S. 39, 43 (1987).
48. Id. at 61.
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of the information on the prosecution team? Did the prosecutor have notice of
the information's existence and importance? Was it logistically possible to lo-
cate the information? But the federal courts have not been able to settle how
Brady applies to police personnel files. Nor have they been required to settle
this question, because the Justice Department adopted a policy that requires
federal agents' files to be searched upon request by the defense. As a result,
there is a gap in the federal case law on how Brady applies to police personnel
files,
1. The limits of constructive knowledge
How much of what the police know should be imputed to the prosecutor?
The courts steer between two extremes in answering this question. Impute too
little and the prosecution can "get around Brady by keeping itself in i orance,
or compartmentalizing information about different aspects of a case." Impute
too much and the search requirements become so onerous as to "condemn the
prosecution of criminal cases to a state of paralysis."50 A number of practical
distinctions have been employed to limit a prosecutor's constructive knowl-
edge.
First, the prosecutor is not responsible for information held by third parties
or information held by arms of the government not "closely aligned" with the
prosecution.1 The third-party determination is straightforward, but determin-
ing how closely aligned an agency must be is not, and it has resulted in a spat-
ter of ad hoc judgments about what the prosecutor can be held to constructively
know.52 A variation on this factor is that courts are inclined to impute knowl-
49. Carey v. Duckworth, 738 F.2d 875, 878 (7th Cir. 1984); see also Hollman v. Wil-
son, 158 F.3d 177, 181 (3d Cir. 1998); United States v. Morris, 80 F.3d 1151, 1169 (7th Cir.
1996); United States v. Auten, 632 F.2d 478, 481 (5th Cir. Unit A 1980); cf United States v.
Thornton, I F.3d 149, 158 (3d Cir. 1993) ("The prosecutors have an obligation to make a
thorough inquiry of all enforcement agencies that had a potential connection with the wit-
nesses.").
50. United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting United States
v. Gambino, 835 F. Supp. 74, 95 (E.D.N.Y. 1993), aff'd, 59 F.3d 353 (2d Cir. 1995)) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
51. United States v. Brooks, 966 F.2d 1500, 1503 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ("The cases finding
a duty to search have involved files maintained by branches of government 'closely aligned
with the prosecution,' and in each case the court has found the bureaucratic boundary too
weak to limit the duty." (citation omitted) (quoting United States ex rel. Fairman, 769 F.2d
386, 391 (7th Cir. 1985))).
52. See United States v. Rivera-Rodriguez, 617 F.3d 581, 595 (1st Cir. 2010) (finding
a probation officer outside the prosecution team); United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 218
(3d Cir. 2005) (finding Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration (PWBA) records out-
side the prosecutor's constructive knowledge because the PWBA had no working relation-
ship with the prosecution team); Morris, 80 F.3d at 1169 (finding the Office of Thrift Super-
vision, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Internal Revenue Service outside
the prosecution team because the case law could not "be read as imposing a duty on the
prosecutor's office to learn of information possessed by other government agencies that have
no involvement in the investigation or prosecution at issue"). Judge Richard Nygaard syn-
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edge to the prosecutor when she had authority over the person with actual
knowledge of the information-though some courts say such authority is not
necessary.5 3
A second factor in determining the prosecutor's constructive knowledge is
logistical. Circuit courts have held that prosecutors need not "search their unre-
lated files to exclude the possibility, however remote, that they contain excul-
patory information," because that "would place an unreasonable burden on
prosecutors."54 They have also held that it would be "an unreasonable exten-
sion" of Brady to require prosecutors "'to sift fastidiously' through millions of
pages" of documents in the government's possession.55 Some circuits apply a
sliding scale to the logistical question: "As the burden of the proposed exami-
nation rises, clearly the likelihood of a pay-off must also rise before the gov-
ernment can be put to the effort."5 6 Others require specific requests from the
defense to trigger the prosecutor's duty to learn:
[W]here a prosecutor has no actual knowledge or cause to know of the exist-
ence of Brady material in a file unrelated to the case under prosecution, a de-
fendant, in order to trigger an examination of such unrelated files, must make
a specific request for that infonnation-specific in the sense that it explicitly
identifies the desired material and is objectively limited in scope.57
A third factor is the reasonable diligence doctrine, which holds that prose-
cutors do not have to learn of or disclose information that a reasonably diligent
defendant could have located on her own.58 While the definition of reasonable
diligence is not always clear, the doctrine generally absolves prosecutors of
thesized the doctrine's development in United States v. Risha, 445 F.3d 298, 307-09 (3d Cir.
2006) (Nygaard, J., dissenting).
53. Compare Moon v. Head, 285 F.3d 1301, 1310 (11th Cir. 2002) (authority re-
quired), and United States v. Dominguez-Villa, 954 F.2d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (same),
with United States v. Jennings, 960 F.2d 1488, 1490 (9th Cir. 1992) (authority not required),
and United States v. Osorio, 929 F.2d 753, 762 (1st Cir. 1991) (same).
54. United States v. Joseph, 996 F.2d 36, 41 (3d Cir. 1993).
55. United States v. Gray, 648 F.3d 562, 567 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v.
Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 297 (6th Cir. 2010)); see also United States v. Beers, 189 F.3d 1297,
1304 (10th Cir. 1999) ("It is unrealistic to expect federal prosecutors to know all information
possessed by state officials affecting a federal case, especially when the information results
from an unrelated state investigation.").
56. Brooks, 966 FI2d at 1504; see also United States v. Combs, 267 F.3d 1167, 1175
(10th Cir. 2001) (citing the minimal "burden" on the prosecution of checking with Pretrial
Services about its "star witness," but not reaching the issue because of materiality).
57. Joseph, 996 F.2d at 41.
58. See United States v. Ladoucer, 573 F.3d 628, 636 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Rodriguez, 162 F.3d 135, 147 (1st Cir. 1998); United States v. Aichele, 941 F.2d 761, 764
(9th Cir. 1991) ("When, as here, a defendant has enough information to be able to ascertain
the supposed Brady material on his own, there is no suppression by the government."); 2
WRiowr & HENNING, supra note 39, § 256, at 135 ("Evidence equally available to the de-
fendant by the exercise of due diligence means that the government is not obligated under
Brady to produce it.").
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having to search court records or other publicly available government sources
for Brady material.59
These guidelines create a good deal of uncertainty about how far the prose-
cutor's constructive knowledge extends in general, and that uncertainty has not
been settled in the context of police personnel files,
2. Law enforcement personnelfiles
Federal courts have had little to say about how Brady's constructive
knowledge doctrine-that is, the prosecutor's duty to learn-applies to law en-
forcement personnel files. In the 1980s and 1990s, a circuit split developed re-
garding federal prosecutors' duties, upon a defense request, o search federal
agents' files. This split seemed primed for reevaluation and resolution in the
wake of the Supreme Court's 1995 decision in Kyles v. Whitley. Instead, the
split faded in significance because of a Justice Department policy requiring
federal prosecutors, upon receiving a request from the defense, to have federal
agents' files searched for Brady material. Because of this policy and the effect
of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) on the federal
review of state convictions, the federal courts of appeals were left largely with-
out the opportunity-or the need-to settle how Brady applies to these person-
nel files.
a. The circuit split
Going back to the 1970s and early 1980s, a few circuit decisions addressed
Brady's application to law enforcement personnel files. But they did so in a
case-by-case manner that did not purport to create a blanket rule for the files.60
The Ninth Circuit took the first step toward establishing a blanket ruie in Unit-
ed States v. Henthorn, holding that federal prosecutors, upon request of the de-
fendant, must search federal agents' personnel files for potential impeachment
tnaterial.6 1 The Third Circuit later adopted this position.62 But the Sixth, Sev-
enth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits came out differently.63 Those circuits held
59. 2 WRIGHT & HENNING, supra note 39, § 256, at 140-41.
60. E.g., United States v. Muse, 708 F,2d 513, 517 (10th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Deutsch, 475 F.2d 55, 57-58 (5th Cir. 1973).
61. 931 F.2d 29, 30-31 (9th Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Jennings, 960 F.2d
1488, 1490 (9th Cir. 1992) (following Henthorn). The first attempt at such a rule was in
United States v. Cadet, 727 F.2d 1453, 1467 (9th Cir. 1984), but this case, for unknown rea-
sons, had little effect.
62. United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 191 (3d Cir. 1998).
63. See United States v. Quinn, 123 F.3d 1415, 1422 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Driscoll, 970 F.2d 1472, 1482 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v. Pou, 953 F.2d 363, 366-67
(8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Andrus, 775 F.2d 825, 843 (7th Cir. 1985) ("Mere specula-
tion that a government file may contain Brady material is not sufficient to require a remand
for in camera inspection, much less reversal for a new trial." (quoting United States v. Na-
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that if a personnel file was not searched, there was no need to remand the case
for such a search unless the defendant, on appeal, could show more than "mere
speculation" that the file would contain impeachment material.64 Several other
courts expressed ambivalence about which side of the split to join. 65
The difference in these approaches to the personnel files has been por-
trayed as a split between those circuits that require a Brady search upon defense
request and those that do not. But the nature of the ostensible split was never so
clear.66 First, it was unclear whether the Brady rule articulated by these cases-
whichever way the rule went-would apply to state prosecutors' searches of
state law enforcement files or whether it applied only to federal prosecutors'
searches of federal agents' files.6 7 Second, the courts on the majority side of
the split-the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits-did not explicitly
absolve prosecutors of their Brady duties with respect to these files; rather, they
applied a form of harmless error eview in deciding whether to remand the
case.68 Third, in a number of the decisions on the majority side of the split,
prosecutors did actually conduct Brady searches of the personnel files. What
the reviewing courts refused to do was to order lower courts-or to allow de-
fendants-to conduct additional searches on appeal.69 Fourth, the Supreme
Court destabilized whatever rules might have emerged from this putative split
when it held, in Kyles v. Whitley, that prosecutors have a duty to learn of any
favorable evidence known to other members of the prosecution team, including
the police.70 Indeed, Kyles so undermined these cases on both sides of the split
that commentators expected the split would have to be reexamined in the wake
of Kyles.71 But that reexamination never occurred,
varro, 737 F.2d 625, 631 (7th Cir. 1984))); see also United States v. Van Brocklin, 115 F.3d
587, 594 (8th Cir. 1997).
64, See, e.g., Andrus, 775 F.2d at 843.
65. United States v. Brooks, 966 F.2d 1500, 1502-04 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Murray v. U.S.
Dep't of Justice, 821 F. Supp. 94, 106 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
66. Robert S. Mahler, Extracting the Gate Key: Litigating Brady Issues, CHAMPION,
May 2001, at 14, 20 ("In short, in the Ninth Circuit ask and ye shall receive. Elsewhere, you
better be prepared to make a showing of what you expect to find of an impeaching nature in
a testifying officer's personnel records.").
67. See, e.g., United States v. Doniinguez-Villa, 954 F.2d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 1992)
(holding that, in federal prosecutions, the government "is not obligated to review state law
enforcement files not within its possession or control").
68. This deferential standard of review may amount to the same thing as excusing the
search in the first place, but the uncertainty adds to the murkiness.
69. See, e.g., United States v. Quinn, 123 F.3d 1415, 1421-22 (11th Cir, 1997).
70. 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995).
71. Cf Lis Wiehi, Keeping Files on the File Keepers: When Prosecutors Are Forced




b. The Justice Department policy
To this day, the circuit split has not been resolved, but it has long since
grown stale. Why did the courts of appeals never establish a uniform rule for
Brady's application to these files? Part of the explanation may well be the Jus-
tice Department's policy decision, in 1991, to require federal prosecutors to
have federal agents' files searched upon defense request. 72 This policy was de-
signed to bring Ninth Circuit federal prosecutors in line with the search re-
quirements articulated in United States v. Henthorn. But federal prosecutors
around the country soon adopted this approach, essentially resolving the split as
a matter of policy. 73 The Justice Department policy required each investigative
agency within the Department's control to search agents' files for Brady mate-
rial 74 and, if anything was found, to notify the prosecutor, who would then "de-
termine whether the information should be disclosed or whether an in camera
review by the district court is appropriate."75
This policy evolved several times over the years to articulate specific defi-
nitions of Brady-qualifying material and specific protocols by which prosecu-
tors could gain access to the files.76 Despite the centralized guidelines, howev-
er, variations appeared in federal practice with respect to the personnel files.
Federal agencies and federal prosecutors differed on which of their files were
searched, whether prosecutors received summaries or raw documentation of
the misconduct,78 and whether searches were required even without a defense
72. Id. at 106 (describing the 1991 memo sent to all U.S. Attorneys' Offices in the
wake of United States v. Henthorn).
73. See infra notes 74, 79.
74. For example, in Quinn, the district judge stated at a suppression hearing: "As far as
personal (sic] records go, the government has to see ifthey're ... Brady or Gigio ... . Eve-
rybody knows that. . .. [T]he government should be reviewing those records to determine
whether this is Brady material . ... " 123 F.3d at 1421 (first, second, and third alterations in
original); see also United States v. Bertoli, 854 F. Supp. 975, 1041 (D.N.J.) ("The Govern-
ment is complying with, and will continue to comply with, the Department of Justice's
Henthorn policy concerning the personnel files of all Government agents and all present or
former Government employees expected to testify at trial." (quoting Government Personnel
Files Briefat 6)), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 40 F.3d 1384 (3d Cir, 1994).
75. United States v. Jennings, 960 F.2d 1488, 1492 n.3 (9th Cir. 1992) (describing the
federal government's counsel's explanation of the policy),
76. Office of the Att'y Gen., Policy Regarding the Disclosure to Prosecutors of Poten-
tial Impeachment Information Concerning Law Enforcement Agency Witnesses ("Giglio
Policy") (Dec. 9, 1996), http://www.justice.gov/ag/policy-regarding-disclosure-prosecutors
-potential-impeachment-information-concerning-law; see also Lisa A. Regini, Disclosing
Officer Misconduct: A Constitutional Duty, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., July 1996, at 27,
31.
77. See Brief for the United States at 6-8, United States v. Herring, 83 F.3d 1120 (9th
Cir. 1996) (Nos. 95-10521, 95-10541) (describing Drug Enforcement Administration, Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Internal Rev-




request.7 9 The current United States Attorneys' Manual requires prosecutors
"to seek all exculpatory and impeachment information from all the members of
the prosecution team," including "federal, state, and local law enforcement of-
ficers and other government officials participating in the investigation and
prosecution of the criminal case against he defendant."8 0 Whatever flaws it
possesses,8 1 the Justice Department policy nonetheless acknowledges that per-
sonnel files contain Brady material and that they must be searched according-
ly.82
c. The policy's effect on the doctrine
The gap in the federal case law on Brady's application to personnel files
may well be an unintended consequence of this Justice Department policy. Un-
der the policy, a federal defendant could simply request a search of the federal
agents' files, and the ease of making this request arguably reduced the number
of federal cases that otherwise would have put the Brady question before the
79. United States v. Brassington, No. 09-CR-45 (DMC), 2010 WL 3982036, at *16
(D.NJ. Oct. 8, 2010); Brief of Appellee & Supplemental Appendix, United States v. Dent,
149 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1998) (No. 97-1666), 1997 WL 33565644, at *35; Government's Om-
nibus Response to Defendant Jones' Pretrial Motions at 11, United States v. Jones, No. 2:07-
cr-145-KJD-PAL (D. Nev. Aug. 11, 2008), 2008 WL 8626186; see also Response to the De-
fendant's Omnibus Pretrial Motions at 7, United States v. Ramos, No. 12-CR-103-S
(W.D.N.Y. May 31, 2013) ("A search of the personnel files of the agents and officers who
will [be] testifying for instances where they have been found to have engaged in misconduct
and/or been disciplined will be made in this case (as it is done in all cases) . . . ."); Defendant
Demarco Deon Williams's Motion to Compel Production of Impeachment Material & Brief
in Support at 2, United States v. Williams, No. 08-CR-21-CVE, 2008 WL 938957 (N.D.
Okla. Apr. 7, 2008) (quoting a federal prosecutor as acknowledging during a prior hearing a
Brady policy of inquiring with local police agencies about internal affairs findings); Tele-
phone Interview with Charles Miller, Assistant Prosecutor, Kanawha Cnty., W. Va., Former
U.S. Att'y for the S Dist. of W. Va. (Mar, 12, 2014) ("Every time a witness was identified
who was a law enforcement officer or agent, a letter was sent to their agency asking for a
review of their file, asking if there were any substantiated allegations of misconduct.").
80. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-5,001(B)(2) (2014).
81. See Telephone Interview with Rob Cary, Att'y, Williams & Connolly (Apr. 4,
2014) (describing the Justice Department's Giglio policy as "offensively protective" of
agents).
82. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 80, § 9-5.100(5)(c) ("[Plotential
impeachment information relating to agency employees may include, but is not limited to ...
i) any finding of misconduct that reflects upon the truthfulness or possible bias of the em-
ployee, including a finding of lack of candor during a criminal, civil, or administrative in-
quiry or proceeding; ii) any past or pending criminal charge brought against he employee;
iii) any allegation of misconduct bearing upon truthfulness, bias, or integrity that is the sub-
ject of a pending investigation; iv) prior findings by a judge that an agency employee has
testified untruthfully, made a knowing false statement in writing, engaged in an unlawful
search or seizure, illegally obtained a confession, or engaged in other misconduct; v) any
misconduct finding or pending misconduct allegation that either casts a substantial doubt
upon the accuracy of any evidence-including witness testimony-that the prosecutor in-
tends to rely on to prove an element of any crime charged, or that might have a significant
bearing on the admissibility of prosecution evidence.").
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federal courts. At the same time, the passage in 1996 of AEDPA greatly re-
duced the other major source of cases in which the federal courts could have
made case law on this Brady issue: habeas review of state convictions83 The
combination of the Justice Department's policy and AEDPA thus worked to
choke off the opportunity-and the need-for the federal courts to settle the
question of Brady's application to police personnel files. And this helped create
the gap in the federal case law.
I do not want to overstate the claim. Even with the Justice Department's
policy and AEDPA, federal cases have addressed Brady's application to law
enforcement personnel files.84 But these cases have not been interpreted-at
least not yet-as defining uniform rules about whether Brady requires a search
of testifying officers' files. Indeed, the federal case law applying Brady to these
files has tended to address issues on the margins of the Justice Department's
policy: Can prosecutors delegate the search duties?85 Does a prosecutor have
constructive knowledge of misconduct known to the officer but yet to be de-
tected by anyone else?86 These cases do not answer the core questions: Will
knowledge of what is in the agents' personnel files be imputed to prosecutors?
And does this constructive knowledge require prosecutors to conduct routine
searches of the files?
In the end, the key point is that the federal courts, from the Supreme Court
down, have not made explicit how Brady applies to law enforcement personnel
files, and the Justice Department's policy, combined with AEDPA, helped take
this question off the agenda. For federal defendants, it may not matter whether
the files are searched as a matter of policy or as a matter of case law-so long
as they are searched. But it does matter for state defendants. The lack of federal
case law on this issue provided the states much leeway in deciding how Brady
83. Under the relevant AEDPA provision, federal courts cannot reach the merits of the
case unless the state court's decision was "contrary to ... clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," meaning a holding. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1) (2013); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000). That leaves lit-
tie opportunity to make new law on habeas, because if the law announced is new, then it is
not established enough for the state court's contrary decision to qualify for review on the
merits. See Harrison v. Lockyer, 316 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003) (deferring to the Cali-
fornia courts under AEDPA, but questioning how the defendant can be required to know
what is in a personnel file before he can review it).
84. E.g., Milke v. Ryan, 711 F.3d 998, 1006 (9th Cir. 2013); Simmons v. Anderson,
209 F.3d 718, 2000 WL 283172 (5th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (unpublished table opinion);
Michael Pariente, The Fight for Personnel Files in Defending DUI Charges: Using Milke v.
Ryan to Help Your Client, Nevada CLE Webinar (May 7, 2014) (noting that Milke v. Ryan
has had modest success in getting Nevada police files reviewed under Brady); see infra notes
85-86.
85. United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 191 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding that Brady re-
quires the government to "direct the custodian of the [police personnel] files to inspect them
for exculpatory evidence and inform the prosecution of the results of that inspection, or, al-
ternatively, submit the files to the trial court for in camera review"); United States v. Jen-
nings, 960 F.2d 1488, 1490 (9th Cir. 1992).
86. United States v. Robinson, 627 F.3d 941, 952 (4th Cir. 2010); see also Breedlove
v. Moore, 279 F.3d 952, 962 (11th Cir. 2002).
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applies to records of police misconduct, and this leeway has resulted in dra-
matic variations in Brady's application across the nation.
II. BRADYS APPLICATION TO POLICE PERSONNEL FILES IN THE STATES
In the absence of federal case law, a variety of Brady approaches have
emerged in the states. This Part divides jurisdictions into four groups. In Group
1, state statutes and local policies make police personnel files so confidential
that not even the prosecutor can look inside them to search for Brady material.
In Group 2, state statutes make the misconduct a matter of public record, and,
as public record, it is not considered to be within the scope of Brady. In Group
3, prosecutors have access to the personnel files while defendants do not, and
the prosecutors put systems in place to learn of and disclose this Brady infor-
mation. In Group 4, prosecutors have special access to the files that defendants
do not, but the prosecutors do not put systems in place to learn of or disclose
the Brady evidence.
There are several consequences to this inconsistent application of Brady.
First, it deprives defendants of their constitutional due process rights simply by
virtue of where they happen to be tried and thus calls into question the idea that
Brady provides a floor of procedural rights below which state law cannot drop.
Second, this patchwork of Brady regimes demonstrates the ways in which fac-
tors outside of constitutional law-state statutes, local policies, institutional
conflicts-have real bearing on the meaning of doctrine. Any constitutional
analysis of Brady must take into account these nontraditional factors. Finally,
the disparities in Brady's application across these four groups suggest that
Brady violations have deeper, more seemingly legitimate causes than prosecu-
torial cheating, at least as far as police personnel files are concerned. When it
comes to these files, the people suppressing impeachment evidence oflen do so
overtly and under color of law, albeit law that appears to conflict with the Con-
stitution.
A. Group 1: "No Access" Regimes
Brady requires prosecutors to learn of and disclose favorable, material in-
formation known to anyone on the prosecution team, including the police. In
this first group ofjurisdictions, however, prosecutors are barred by state laws or
local rules from looking in the police personnel files to see whether the files
contain Brady material. Whether a prosecutor can satisfy his disclosure re-
quirement when he cannot access these files is the central tension in this first
group ofjurisdictions.
The poster child for these jurisdictions is California, where more than 500
law enforcement agencies employ roughly 80,000 police officers, or about one-
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tenth of all the officers in the country.8 7 By statute, law enforcement personnel
records are "confidential and shall not be disclosed in any criminal or civil pro-
ceeding"8 8 unless the party seeking the information shows "good cause for the
discovery or disclosure sought." If good cause is shown, the judge will re-
view the files in camera to decide what must be disclosed.90 The officer and the
officer's representative are the only ones allowed to attend this in camera re-
91view.
California's legislature created these statutory protections for the files-
collectively known as the Pitchess provisions-to protect police personnel files
from overly intrusive discovery requests by criminal defendants and civil liti-
gants.92 These statutory provisions were part of an effort by the legislature in
1978 to limit the reach of a 1974 California Supreme Court decision, Pitchess
v. Superior Court, which gave criminal defendants the ability to subpoena cer-
tain materials from police personnel files.9 3 The legislative history shows no
indication that lawmakers were thinking of prosecutors or Brady when they
passed the Pitchess laws; the legislation was designed to block discovery re-
quests by defendants and civil litigants. But California courts have held that
these statutory protections apply to prosecutors seeking access to the files for
Brady purposes, just as they apply to everyone else. 94
The practice of applying these personnel file restrictions to prosecutors
creates the obvious potential for a conflict between Pitchess and Brady. After
all, how can a prosecutor carry out his Brady obligation to disclose evidence in
these files if, under state law, he cannot look inside them on his own? Despite
the apparent tension between the Pitchess statutes and Brady, California courts
have done their best to avoid acknowledging a conflict. In 2002, the California
Supreme Court explicitly left open the question whether Pitchess would violate
Brady "if it were applied to defeat the right of the prosecutor to obtain access to
officer personnel records in order to comply with Brady."9 The court was not
bothered by any Brady implications the next year when it stated matter-of-
factly that, unless prosecutors go through the Pitchess procedures, "peace of-
87. BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CENSUS OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, 2008, at 15 app. tbl.6 (2011).
88. CAL. PENAL CODE § 832.7(a) (West 2014).
89. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1043, 1045 (West 2014); see also Miguel A. Neri, Pitchess v.
Brady; The Need for Legislative Reform of California's Confidentiality Protection for
Peace-Officer Personnel Information, 43 McGEORGE L. REv. 301, 304 (2012) (discussing
conflict over personnel files in California).
90. CAL. EviD. CODE § 1045(b); City of L.A. v. Superior Court (Brandon), 52 P.3d
129, 134 (Cal. 2002) (quoting City of Santa Cruz v. Mun. Court, 776 P.2d 222, 226 (Cal.
1989) (en banc)).
91. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1045(b) (referring to procedures in CAL. EviD. CODE § 915(b));
see People v. Mooc, 36 P.3d 21, 29 (Cal. 2001).
92. See City of Santa Cruz, 776 P.2d at 227; Neri, supra note 89, at 309.
93. 522 P.2d 305, 309 (Cal. 1974) (en bane).
94. See Neri, supra note 89, at 309; infra notes 95-98.
95. Brandon, 52 P.3d at 136 n.2.
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ficer personnel records retain their confidentiality vis-A-vis the prosecution."96
Shortly thereafter, the California Court of Appeal held that Pitchess's bar on
prosecutorial access to personnel files did not violate Brady.97 The court rea-
soned, rather circularly, that because the prosecutor "does not have access to
confidential peace officer files," he could not have a Brady obligation to dis-
close information contained in them.98 Other California appellate decisions
have similarly concluded that the Pitchess statutes apply to prosecutors' Brady
searches.99
In light of the restrictions on accessing the files, prosecutors around the
state have taken a number of different approaches to applying Brady to the
files. One approach is to say that prosecutors are excused from having to search
the files, given that they are statutorily denied access to the contents of these
files. 100 This approach finds support in the Court of Appeal's decision in Peo-
ple v. Gutierrez, which held that prosecutors cannot be expected to disclose
what they are not allowed to access.10 1 But it seems to be at odds with the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Kyles v. Whitley, which held that prosecutors have
a duty to learn of favorable information known by members of the prosecution
team. 102
Another approach to the conflict between Brady and the personnel file pro-
tections is to acknowledge that prosecutors have constructive knowledge of in-
formation in the personnel files and then enlist the help of the police and the
judiciary in bringing forth that Brady material without the prosecutors' directly
accessing the files. One quarter of the state's counties, including some of its
largest, embrace disclosure systems like San Francisco's, in which the police
department-not he prosecutor-reviews officers' personnel files for potential
Brady material.0 3 If the department's Brady committee finds any material that
96. Alford v. Superior Court, 63 P.3d 228, 236 & n.6 (Cal. 2003).
97. People v. Gutierrez, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 138, 145-47 (Ct. App. 2003).
98. Id. at 147.
99. E.g., Abatti v. Superior Cour, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 767, 781-82 (Ct. App. 2003).
100. Telephone Interview with Jerry Coleman, supra note 20 (discussing Brady practic-
es around California).
101. 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 147.
102. 514 U.S, 419, 437 (1995). Apparently, another approach is just to ignore the issue.
See Jaxon Van Derbeken, Police with Problems Are a Problem for D.A., S.F. CHRON, (May
16, 2010, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarealarticle/Police-with-problems-are-a
-problem-for-D-A-3264681.php (reporting the view of one retired prosecutor that "his col-
leagues were not eager to dig into officers' backgrounds-even though the risks of not doing
so were obvious").
103. See Application of Gregory D. Totten, Ventura County District Attorney, for
Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Petitioner; Amicus Curiae Brief at ii, Peo-
ple v. Superior Court (Johnson), 176 Cal. Rptr. 3d 340 (Ct. App. 2014) (Nos. A140767,
A140768) (listing counties with notification systems); Application of Michael L. Rains, on
Behalf of Peace Officers' Research Ass'n of California (PORAC), the PORAC Legal De-
fense Fund & the San Francisco Police Officers' Ass'n, for Leave to File Anici Curiae Brief
in Support of Petitions for Writ of Mandate, Prohibition or Other Appropriate Relief & Re-
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might impeach the officer's credibility or otherwise materially help a defend-
ant, it notifies the prosecutor that the officer "has material in his or her person-
nel file that may be subject to disclosure under Brady."1 04 When the oflicer is
slated to testify, the prosecutor uses this generic notification from the police to
try to convince the court that there is good cause to trigger the in camera review
allowed by the Pitchess tatutes.105 If the court finds good cause, it will review
the file and decide what must be disclosed.io6 The allure of this system is the
compromise it strikes among the interests of prosecutors, police officers, and
defendants. Prosecutors and defendants get the Brady information disclosed,
while police officers get to keep their files secret from everyone except the
judge.
But the viability of this system is now in jeopardy, thanks to a recent Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal decision. In August 2014, a panel of the Court of Ap-
peal held that prosecutors have an obligation to learn of Brady material in law
enforcement personnel files and that the statutory protections for the files do
not prevent prosecutors from searching the files for Brady purposes.10 7 The
court reasoned, on statutory construction rather than constitutional grounds,
that the prosecutor and the police form a single prosecution team, so allowing
the prosecutor to search the files for Brady material is not the type of disclosure
that the personnel file statute was designed to guard against. o
This recent decision created conflicts within California appellate case law
both on the question of whether prosecutors have a Brady duty to learn of in-
formation in police personnel files10 9 and on the question of whether the
Pitchess protections limit prosecutors' ability to search the files for Brady ma-
quests for Stay at iii, Johnson, 176 Cal. Rptr. 3d 340 (Nos. A140767, A140768) (listing
counties where prosecutors must file Pitchess motions).
104. S.F. Police Dep't, Bureau Order No. 2010-01, Procedure for Disclosure of Materi-
als from Law Enforcement Personnel Records in Compliance with Brady and Evidence
Codes § 1043 Et Seq (Aug. 3, 2010) [hereinafter SFPD Disclosure Order]; Petition for Writ
of Mandate, Prohibition or Other Appropriate Relief & Stay Request; Memorandum of
Points & Authorities in Support of Petition at 16-17, Johnson, 176 Cal. Rptr. 3d 340 (Nos.
Al40767, Al40768) [hereinafter SFPD Brief], The possibility that the file might have more
idiosyncratic impeachment material is ignored. See Petition for Writ of Mandamus/Prohibi-
tion at 45, Johnson, 176 Cal. Rptr. 3d 340 (Nos. A140767, A140768) ("[P]olice legal staff
and its Brady committee have segregated from officer personnel files only information re-
flective of dishonesty, bias, or other evidence of conduct of moral turpitude." (bolding omit-
ted)),
105. SFPD Disclosure Order, supra note 104.
106. Id
107. Johnson, 176 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 346, 361-63, depublished and review granted by 336
P.3d 159 (Cal. 2014).
108. Id at 350, 354-56, 358 ("[Wlhen a prosecutor acting as the head of a prosecution
team inspects officer personnel files, or portions thereof, for Brady purposes, that inspection
does not constitute disclosure of the files in a criminal proceeding, or otherwise breach the
confidentiality of the files."),
109. Compare id. at 362 (holding prosecutors do have a duty to learn), with People v.




terial."1o By giving prosecutors direct access to the files, the recent appellate
decision also threatened to upend the delicate compromises between prosecu-
tors and police officers around the state over access to the files.
In October 2014, the California Supreme Court granted a petition for re-
view in order to resolve the conflicts this case created within California appel-
late case law.1 " The grant of review makes the recent appellate decision
uncitableI12 More importantly, the California Supreme Court's involvement in
the case means we are soon likely to have more answers about how Brady ap-
plies to law enforcement personnel files, at least in the eyes of the highest court
in the nation's most populous state.113
California is not the only state to face a conflict between Brady and police
privacy protections. In New Hampshire, a state statute long protected the per-
sonnel files at the expense of Brady and its state-law analogue, State v. Lau-
rie.114 In 2004, New Hampshire's Attorney General urged prosecutors and po-
lice agencies to create a system, much like the one in California, to reconcile
these competing pressures.1 15 The system called for the police to notify prose-
cutors "whenever one of that agency's officers has been found to have engaged
in conduct that would fall within one of the categories" of Brady material. 1 6
This notification was to contain no "information regarding the underlying dis-
ciplinary matter, as that information is confidential by statute," the Attorney
General explained. "7 If one of these tainted officers was slated to testify, the
prosecutor would ask for an in camera review of the officer's file and a protec-
110. Compare Johnson, 176 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 361 (holding prosecutors do have the abil-
ity to search files for Brady purposes), with Gutierrez, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 147 (holding prose-
cutors do not have the ability to search files for Brady purposes), and Abatti v. Superior
Court, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 767, 781-82 (Ct. App. 2003) (same).
111. Johnson, 336 P.3d 159.
112. CAL. R. CT, 8.1105(e)(1) ("Unless otherwise ordered . . ., an opinion is no longer
considered published if the Supreme Court grants review or the rendering court grants re-
hearing.").
113. Case Summary, No. S221296, People v. Superior Court (Johnson), CAL. CTS.,
http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/mainCaseScreen.cfm?dist-0&doc id=208
7847&docno=S221296 (last visited Mar. 30, 2015) ("This case presents the following is-
sues: (1) Does the prosecution have a duty to review peace officer personnel files to locate
material that must be disclosed to the defense under Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83?
(2) Does the prosecution have a right to access those files absent a motion under Pitchess v.
Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531? (3) Must the prosecution file a Pitchess motion in or-
der to disclose such Brady material to the defense?").
114. 653 A.2d 549, 550 (N.H. 1995). Laurie interprets the New Hampshire Constitution
with reference to federal Brady law.
115. Memorandum from Peter W. Heed, Att'y Gen., N.H., to All Cnty. Att'ys & All
Law Enforcement Agencies, Identification and Disclosure of Laurie Materials (Feb. 20,
2004), available at http://www.gcglaw.com/resources/police-litigation/pdflNH-Laurie.pdf
("Because police department internal investigations files and personnel files are confidential
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tive order placing "all matters relating to the motion" under seal. 1l The judge
would then decide whether the information in the file had to be released under
Brady." 9
Compared to California courts, however, courts in New Hampshire have
shown more flexibility in addressing the conflict between the personnel file
statutes and Brady. In 2006, the state supreme court held that a trial judge did
not abuse his discretion by ordering a prosecutor to review the personnel file
directly, because the personnel file statute "cannot limit the defendant's consti-
tutional right to obtain all exculpatory evidence."120 Further, in 2012, the legis-
lature amended the personnel file statute to say that "[e]xculpatory evidence in
a police personnel file. . .shall be disclosed to the defendant" and that in cam-
era review was required only 2 i]f a determination cannot be made as to wheth-
er evidence is exculpatory." However, the amendment did not make clear
who "shall" search for the Brady material: prosecutors or police.
Nonetheless, New Hampshire prosecutors report that they are still unable
to search the files, even in furtherance of their Brady responsibilities. "We're
not allowed to look into it," said Assistant Attorney General Stacey Coughlin.
"We rely on the police department to keep accurate record and to let us know if
there are any issues.. . ."122 Defense attempts to get prosecutors to review the
files directly, in light of the new statute, have also failed. In rejecting a defense
motion to compel such a review, one judge ruled that "the plain language" of
the statute "does not impose an affirmative duty on all prosecutors to examine
the personnel files of all law enforcement witnesses." 12 Meanwhile, police of-
ficers continue to lobby for increased confidentiality protections. In early 2014,
the legislature took up-and rejected-a bill that would have further interfered
with prosecutors' Brady duties by preventing them from deciding what in the
file is exculpatory.124 Under the bill's language, the assessment of what was
exculpatory was up to the court and the court alone: "To determine whether or
118. Id
119. Id,
120. State v. Theodosopoulos, 893 A.2d 712, 714 (N.H. 2006).
121. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 105:13-b (2014) (emphasis added). The amendment has
yet to be interpreted in a reported decision.
122. Telephone Interview with Stacey Coughlin, Assistant Att'y Gen., N.H. (Apr. 1,
2014). Of the amendment, Coughlin said, "I don't think it has really changed anything. We
still have the same duty." Id.; see also Telephone Interview with Jeffery Strelzin, Senior As-
sistant Att'y Gen., N.H. (Mar. 31, 2014) ("We typically don't look at the personnel files or
have access to them. . . ."). Patricia LaFrance, head of the state's largest prosecutor's office,
said her prosecutors generally rely on the police to flag misconduct, but occasionally they
review the files directly. "Technically we are still operating under former AG Heed's memo-
randum," she added. E-mail from Patricia M. LaFrance, Hillsborough Cnty. Att'y, to author
(Mar. 31, 2014) (on file with author).
123. Nancy West, Court's Denial of Police Record Review Raises Broader Question,
N.H. UNION LEADER (July 13, 2013, 11:12 PM), http://www.unionleader.com/article/2013
0713/NEWSO3/130719612 (internal quotation mark omitted). The Attorney General's Office
is reexamining its policy. Id; E-mail from Patricia M. LaFrance, supra note 122.
124. H.R. 1315, 163d Gen. Court, 2014 Sess. (N.H. 2014).
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not evidence is exculpatory, an in camera review by the court shall be re-
quired.""2 As it drags on, New Hampshire's conflict over the personnel files
continues to endanger Brady compliance.
Halfway across the country, the justice system in Colorado faces a similar
conflict. In Colorado, the personnel files are confidential, and prosecutors can-
not access them without a subpoena.126 The Colorado Supreme Court an-
nounced, in a civil case, that courts should employ an ad hoc balancing test to
determine whether to grant a subpoena for police personnel records 127 The
state's high court later adopted that same test for criminal cases. 128 Anyone
seeking access to the records-including the prosecutor-must subpoena them,
thus forcing an in camera review of all factors that lean in favor of and against
disclosing the material.129 Among those factors are the importance of the in-
formation to the case, the extent to which disclosure would discourage future
cooperation with investigators, and the effect disclosure would have on the
government's ability to engage in honest self-evaluation. 130
The Colorado Court of Appeals added one more hurdle to any attempt to
gain access to the records: a threshold requirement needed to trigger in camera
review. According to the court, to trigger in camera review, the moving party
must present more "than bare allegations that the requested documents would
relate to the officer's credibility" and must "show how they would be relevant
to his defense of the charges against him." 13 1 This threshold was necessary, the
court explained, lest demands for in camera review become "unnecessarily
burdensome to the courts and the police" by allowing defendants "in virtually
every criminal case" to "obtain in camera review of all documents concerning
the prior conduct of arresting officers."1 32 The effect of this threshold require-
ment is to prevent prosecutors from routinely checking the files, given that they
125. Id
126. Telephone Interview with Ken Kupffier, Chief Deputy Dist. Att'y, Boulder, Colo.
(Mar. 28, 2014) (stating that personnel files are considered "privileged" and confidential");
id. ('Truth is, we don't know anything about the internal affairs investigations .... Based on
my experience, I know law enforcement sure as hell is not going to hand them over to [us]
without a fight."). Lynn Kimbrough, spokesperson for the Denver District Attorney's Office,
said prosecutors are "not really entitled to have" the personnel files. Christopher N. Osher,
Denver Cops' Credibility Problems Not Always Clear to Defenders, Juries, DENV. PosT, (Ju-
ly 10, 2011, 1:00 AM MDT), http://www.denverpost.com/ci 18448755 (internal quotation
mark omitted); see also Colo. Ass'n of Chiefs of Police et al., Situational Examples in Sup-
port of "Best Practices" 1 (2014) (on file with author) (describing the subpoena process the
defendant and prosecutor must use for personnel records).
127. Martinelli v. Dist. Court, 612 P.2d 1083, 1088 (Colo. 1980) (en banc).
128. People v. Walker, 666 P2d 113, 122 (Colo. 1983) (en bane); see also Denver Po-
licemen's Protective Ass'n v. Lichtenstein, 660 F.2d 432, 436 (10th Cir. 1981).
129. Walker, 666 P.2d at 122.
130, Id. (citing Martinelli, 612 P.2d at 1089).
131. People v. Blackmon, 20 P,3d 1215, 1220 (Colo. App. 2000). It was not enough for
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must know something about what the files contain before they can get the court
to consider granting access.133 This impediment to routine inspection of the
files, like those in California and New Hampshire, is troublesome because
Brady is supposed to impose a self-executing, affirmative duty on the prosecu-
tion to search for material in every case.134
In the spring of 2014, however, the associations representing Colorado
prosecutors, police chiefs, and sheriffs-but not police officers-drafted a
"best practices" protocol that would create a notification system like those in
California and New Hampshire. Under the system, the prosecutor is "required
to notify the defendant ... when there is information in a peace officer's or ci-
vilian employee's personnel or internal affairs file that may affect the agency
employee's credibility."' 35 For the prosecutor to carry out her Brady obliga-
tion, the policy declares, it is "necessary for the law enforcement agencies in
the State of Colorado to notify the District Attorney's Office of the existence of
such information."' 36 But the notification is not supposed to say anything about
the contents of the officer's file except that the file contains material that "may
affect his/her credibility in court."137
Other states have also brushed up against this issue. In Vermont, where
state troopers' personnel files are made confidential by statute, the state su-
preme court denied a defendant's Brady claim that he should have received ma-
terial from a trooper's file. 138 In Maine, the legislature amended its personnel
file statute in 2013 to create a Brady exception. The law making the files confi-
dential, the amendment reads, "does not preclude the disclosure of confidential
personnel records" to prosecutors for purposes "related to the determination of
and compliance with the constitutional obligations . . . to provide discovery to a
133. Some prosecutors apparently can access the files. Osher, supra note 1 26.
134. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 438 (1995) ("[T]he prosecution's responsibil-
ity for failing to disclose known, favorable evidence rising to a material level of importance
is inescapable."); United States v. Garrett, 238 F.3d 293, 302 (5th Cir. 2000) ("The Brady
line of cases announces . .. the self-executing constitutional rule that due process requires
disclosure by the prosecution .. .."); infra Part IV.C.2; see also supra note 39 and accompa-
nying text (noting the self-executing nature of the prosecutor's Brady obligation).
135. Colo. Ass'n of Chiefs of Police et al., Brady/Rule 16 "Best Practices" 1 (2014) (on
file with author).
136. Id. (emphasis omitted).
137. Id. at 4 exh. 1; see also id at 3 ("The actual personnel or internal affairs file or any
material contained therein shall not be provided to the District Attorney's Office absent a
court order following an in-camera review."). The protocols line up with the Denver Police
Department's "asterisk list," which was implemented after criticism by an independent po-
lice monitor. See Osher, supra note 126.
138. State v. Roy, 557 A.2d 884, 893 (Vt. 1989) ("There is no exception in the statute
for use of the records in court proceedings. It is clear that the intent of the statute is that the
records not be subject to disclosure except for the statutory purposes."), overruled in part by
State v. Brillon, 955 A.2d 1108 (Vt. 2008). The court left open "the possibility that a defend-




defendant in a criminal matter."139 The amendment was supported by the
Maine Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and by the Maine Attorney
General. 140
Jurisdictions that prevent prosecutors from reviewing the personnel files
create a host of doctrinal problems for Brady, and the notification systems they
employ to get around these problems are themselves deeply flawed, as will be
discussed later on.141 But it is important to note here that, for all the problems
with these notification systems, they at least acknowledge the prosecutor's duty
to have the files searched for Brady material.
B. Group 2: "Public Access" Regimes
Jurisdictions in this second group of Brady regimes make records of police
misconduct publicly accessible. The fact that these records are public elimi-
nates the prosecutor's obligation to discover and disclose them under Brady.
That is because, under the reasonably diligent defendant doctrine, the prosecu-
tor does not have to learn of or disclose any information that a reasonably dili-
gent defendant could have accessed on his own. 142 Nonetheless, some prosecu-
tors in these jurisdictions do seek out and disclose this information.
Florida is the flagship for this public access group, which includes Texas,
Minnesota, Arizona, Tennessee, Kentucky, Louisiana, and South Carolina.143
139, ME. REV. STAT, tit. 30-A, § 503 (2014). Courts have yet to interpret the amend-
ment.
140. An Act Regarding the Disclosure of Certain Records in Criminal Matters: Hearing
on L.D. 900 Before the J. Standing Comm. on the Judiciary, 126th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me.
2013) (prepared statement of Walter F. McKee, Chair, Legislative Committee, Maine Asso-
ciation of Criminal Defense Lawyers) ("There is no good reason why records that may show
a defendant is innocent should somehow be protected from disclosure because of the confi-
dentiality of personnel records.'); id. (prepared statement of William R. Stokes, Deputy
Att'y Gen., Maine) (stating that Brady compliance could be more effective "if state law au-
thorized the law enforcement employer to disclose the confidential personnel records to the
prosecutor for determination of whether discovery of the material is warranted").
141. See infra Part IV.C.
142. See supra note 58.
143. See City of Baton Rouge v. Capital City Press, L.L.C., 7 So. 3d 21, 22-23 (La. Ct.
App. 2009) (noting records' public status in Louisiana); Burton v. York Cnty. Sheriff's
Dep't, 594 S.E.2d 888, 895 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004) ("[W]e find the manner in which the em-
ployees of the Sheriff's Department prosecute their duties to be a large and vital public inter-
est that outweighs their desire to remain out of the public eye."); REPORTERS COMM. FOR
FREEDOM OF THE PREsS, PRIVATE EYES: CONFIDENTIALITY ISSUES AND ACCESS TO POLICE
INVESTIGATION RECORDS 3 (2010), available at http://www.rcfp.org/private-eyes/internal
-investigation-records (noting that Tennessee makes records public with minor exceptions);
Steven D. Zansberg & Pamela Campos, Sunshine on the Thin Blue Line; Public Access to
Police Internal Affairs Files, COMM, LAWYER, Fall 2004, at 34, 35 (quoting Kentucky's At-
torney General as stating that "disciplinary action taken against a public employee is a matter
related to his job performance and a matter about which the public has a right to know"
(quoting Stewart, Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 00-ORD-97, 2000 WL 641066, at *5 (Apr. 13, 2000))
(internal quotation marks omitted)); E-mail from Sharon Ruiz, Pub. Defender, Nashville,
Tenn., to author (Mar. 12, 2014) (on file with author) ("Yes, personnel files are public rec-
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In Florida, disciplinary findings in police personnel files are open to the public,
including defendants, sorosecutors do not have to seek out or disclose infor-
mation from the files, In Broward County, for example, the district attor-
ney's office notifies defendants when there is an ongoing criminal investigation
of an officer, as this information would not be publicly available, but it does not
track internal affairs issues. The task of tracking down internal affairs reports
falls to the defendant, explains Tim Donnelly, Special Prosecutions Chief at the
Broward County prosecutor's office: "A savvy defense attorney will o to the
department and they'll get the internal affairs records on the officer." 14
A similar story plays out in Texas. "Police personnel files are actually
available to defense attorneys by either open-records requests or subpoena, just
as they are to us," said Kevin Petroff, Felony Division Chief of the Galveston
County District Attorney's Office. "That arguably takes them out of traditional
notions of 'Brady' evidence."1 4 6 In Harris County, home to Houston, prosecu-
tors do not review personnel files for Brady material, nor do they maintain a list
of officers with Brady problems, because disciplinary records are already pub-
licly available. "[I]f it's an allegation of untruthfulness or something else that
reflects upon moral turpitude or that would-if you were putting your defense
attorney hat on-would cause you to want to pursue it, sometimes we hear
about it and sometimes we don't," said Scott Durfee, general counsel for the
district attorney's office. 147
However, some prosecutors still do review the personnel files for Brady
material, even though it is publicly available. In Ramsey County, Minnesota,
prosecutors maintain an aggressive Brady policy, even though misconduct rec-
ords are accessible to the public. Several years ago, prosecutors in the county
asked the St. Paul Police Department o search all of its personnel files for any
of eleven categories of " otential" Brady information covering dishonesty, bi-
as, and excessive force. 8 Once the files had been pulled, prosecutors person-
ord. We generally ask our investigators to pull them. Officers are notified when their files
are pulled, so it sometimes causes some political ill will.").
144. See FLA, STAT. § 119.07 (2014); Telephone Interview with Bob Dillinger, Pub. De-
fender, Sixth Judicial Circuit, Fla. (Feb. 11, 2014). Only records of open investigations are
confidential, and this exemption is set to expire in 2018. FLA. STAT. § 119.071(2)(k).
145. Telephone Interview with Timothy Donnelly, Chief, Special Prosecutions Unit,
Broward State Att'y Office, Fla. (Mar. 31, 2014).
146. E-mail from Kevin Petroff, Felony Div. Chief, Galveston Cnty. Dist. Att'y Office,
to author (Apr. 7, 2014) (on file with author). It is worth noting, however, that a number of
large municipal agencies in Texas are governed by the state's civil service code, which limits
public access to disciplinary records. TEx. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 143.089(g) (West
2013). The Houston Police Department, which is governed by this civil service code, makes
summaries of police misconduct publicly available through the city's human resources de-
partment but requires a subpoena before it will release the information to defendants. Tele-
phone Interview with Tuan Nguyen, Att'y, Hous. Police Dep't (Apr. 9, 2014).
147. Telephone Interview with Scott Durfee, Gen. Counsel, Harris Cnty. Dist. Att'y Of-
fice, Tex. (Apr. 8, 2014).
148. Telephone Interview with Rick Dusterhoft, Prosecutor, Ramsey Cnty. Dist, Att'y
Office, Minn. (Feb. 26, 2014).
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ally reviewed them to decide which officers to put on the Brady list, and they
have continued to update the list monthly based on new misconduct findings
from the police.149 Prosecutor Rick Dusterhoft, who led the project, said prose-
cutors keep track of this information, even though not required to by Brady, be-
cause they want to avoid cross-examination ambushes by defendants whose at-
torneys obtained the police records and ineffective assistance of counsel claims
by defendants whose attorneys did not obtain the information.150
Another example of voluntary Brady disclosures can be found in Arizona's
Maricopa County, home to Phoenix. In 2004, the Maricopa County Attorney's
Office launched an aggressive policy aimed at digging up Brady material in po-
lice personnel files, even though Arizona is a public-record state. 1' Bill Ama-
to, the prosecutor who led the project, met with the chiefs of the county's two
dozen law enforcement agencies and warned them of possible civil liability if
they withheld Brady material from these files. "[1]f I get screwed on this," he
remembers saying, "I'm taking my finger and I'm pointing it directly at
you .... [Y]ou guys now have some skin in the game."l2 Within weeks, the
police agencies dumped so many personnel records on Amato that he had to get
a second office for the overflow,153
Under the Maricopa County policy, law enforcement agencies are required
to provide records of all disciplinary actions that concern "a law enforcement
employee's truthfulness, bias, or moral turpitude." 54 Prosecutors have even
used tips from police officers and the defense bar to ask about misconduct the
police agencies did not initially disclose.15 5 Once the prosecutor receives the
records, she can then disclose them on her own or provide them to the trial
149. Id.
150. Id.; MINN. STAT. § 13.43 (2014) (describing the public-record status of government
personnel data); see also Wiehl, supra note 71, at 118.
151. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 39-121 (2014); Phx. Police Dep't, Operations Order
2.9(8) (rev. June 2013), available at https://www.phoenix.gov/policesite/Documents/Public
%200ps%2006%2001%2014.pdf; Telephone Interview with Jeremy Mussman, Deputy Dir.,
Maricopa Cnty. Pub. Defender, Ariz. (Feb. 27, 2014); see also State v. Robles, 895 P.2d
1031, 1035 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) ("Although we have found no Arizona authority directly
on point, we decline appellant's invitation to adopt Henthorn. Rather, we adopt the threshold
materiality showing required in United States v. Driscoll." (citations omitted)). But see Tele-
phone Interview with Daisy Flores, Former Cnty. Att'y, Gila Cnty., Ariz. (Mar. 3, 2014)
(stating that the public-record rule "doesn't necessarily mean agencies are very forthcoming
about internal investigations").
152. Telephone Interview with Bill Amato, Police Legal Advisor, Tempe Police Dep't,
Ariz., Former Prosecutor, Maricopa Cnty., Ariz. (Mar. 28, 2014).
153. Id.
154. MARICOPA CNTY. ArT'Y OFFICE, PROSECUTION POLICIES & PROCEDURES § 6.4 (rev,
Oct. 3, 2011) (on file with author).
155. Letter from Bill Amato, Police Legal Advisor, Tempe Police Dep't, to Karl
Auerbach, Acting Chief, Salt River Police Dep't (Dec. 10, 2004) ("Unfortunately we contin-
ue to receive information from the defense bar and other police officers about cases that have
not been reported to our office.").
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judge, who will decide what to release,1 56 Why did prosecutors establish such a
system, given the information's public-record status? Amato said that, under
his reading of Brady case law, "there is an affirmative obligation on the prose-
cution" to have that information, regardless of whether the defendant could get
it on his own.1 5 7
This description of Brady's application in public-record states helps to
demonstrate the diversity of approaches to the Brady issue. It also provides a
retort to the claim that prosecutors could not possibly handle the burden of
keeping track of misconduct in police personnel files: make the misconduct
public, and prosecutors need not spend any time worrying about it. 1
C. Group 3: "Access and Disclosure" Regimes
In the third group of jurisdictions, prosecutors have access to police per-
sonnel files while defendants do not, which places a Brady obligation on the
prosecutors to learn of and disclose material from these files. In these jurisdic-
tions, prosecutors use their access to put in place systems to comply with their
Brady duties. Of the four types of disclosure regimes, this is the most straight-
forward because it treats personnel file evidence like any other favorable, mate-
rial information known to the prosecution team.
Prosecutors in Washington State fall into this disclosure group. Statewide
associations representing prosecutors, police hiefs, and sheriffs have adopted
model rules calling on law enforcement agencies to "review all their internal
investigation files to determine if any possible Brady information exists on any
of their employees who may be called as witnesses by the prosecution."159
Where such information exists, the agencies "must submit the information to
the prosecutor," who is then free to disclose it without asking the court for
permission.i16 Prosecutors in King County, home to Seattle, employ Brady lists
156. Id.; Bill Amato, BRADY and Officer Integrity, PowerPoint Presentation to Tempe
Police Dep't (n.d.) (on file with author).
157. Telephone Interview with Bill Amato, supra note 152; Kyle Daly, Pinal County
Attorney's Office Compiling List of Cops with Questionable Integrity, INMARICOPA.COM
(Aug. 12, 2013, 12:29 PM), http://www.inmaricopa.com/Article/2013/08/12/pinal-county
-attorney-office-lando-voyles-brady-list-cops-questionable-integrity-lizarraga (announcing
the Pinal County Attorney's Office's Brady list).
158. See infra notes 184-87 and accompanying text.
159. WASH. ASS'N OF SHERIFFS & POLICE CHIEFS, MODEL POLICY FOR LAW
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES REGARDING BRDY EVIDENCE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT WITNESSES
WHO ARE EMPLOYEES/OFFICERS 3 (2009); see Mary Ellen Reimund, Are Brady Lists (aka
Liar's Lists) the Scarlet Letter for Law Enforcement Officers? A Need for Expansion and
Uniformity, INT'L J. HUM. & Soc. Sc., Sept. 2013, at 1, 2 (discussing Brady list use in Wash-
ington); see also WASH. Ass'N OF PROSECUTING ATT'YS, MODEL POLICY, DISCLOSURE OF
POTENTIAL IMPEACHMENT EVIDENCE FOR RECURRING INVESTIGATIVE OR PROFESSIONAL
WITNESSEs 3-5 (2013).
160. WASH Ass'N OF SHERIFFS & POLICE CHIEFS, supra note 159, at 3.
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to track the misconduct of the 3000 law enforcement agents in the county, as do
prosecutors in other Washington counties.161
In North Carolina, police personnel files are confidential by statute,162 and
case law prevents defendants from subpoenaing them without providing "spe-
cific factual allegations detailing reasons justifying disclosure." But prosecu-
tors have easy access to the files, and some use that access to seek out and dis-
close Brady information. In 2013, District Attorney Ben David, former head of
the North Carolina Conference of District Attorneys, implemented a "height-
ened Giglio screening process" for New Hanover and Pender Counties.164 The
policy requires all officers to self-report Brady 65 issues in their backgrounds
and requires all police agencies to search officers' personnel records for credi-
bility issues going back ten years.'66 "Our duty in North Carolina is nearly ab-
solute to disclose what we know and what we should know," said Tom Old, the
prosecutor directing the pr oect. "What we should know is what is contained in
internal affairs files .... In Old's estimation, prosecutors have "an affirma-
tive duty to gain access to those [files] and disclose anything that reflects on an
officer's credibility or bias."168
Elsewhere in North Carolina, disclosure is less formal and less forthcom-
ing. Prosecutors in Buncombe County, home to Asheville, have no policy for
checking personnel files for Brady material.169 In Pitt County, the city attor-
ney-not the prosecutor-has the task of going through the personnel files for
potential Brady material. According to the policy of one police department
there, the city attorney is allowed to disclose the information to prosecutors on-
ly if prosecutors agree not to disclose it to the defense without in camera re-
view. 170
In the District of Columbia, prosecutors maintain a list of officers with
credibility issues. 1 71 Upon disciplining a police officer, the Metropolitan Police
161. Reimund, supra note 159, at 2.
162. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-24 (2014); id. § 160A-168.
163. In re Brooks, 548 S.E.2d 748, 755 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001).
164. Procedure for Disclosure of Brady/Giglio Material, Attachment to Memorandum
from Benjamin R. David, Dist. Att'y, N.C. Fifth Prosecutorial Dist., to Law Enforcement
Officers of the Fifth Prosecutorial Dist, (Apr. 3, 2013) (on file with author).
165. The policy speaks of "Giglio material," which is a reference to United States v.
Giglio, in which the Supreme Court extended Brady to impeachment evidence. 405 U.S.
150, 154 (1972). Any Giglio material is Brady material.
166. Procedure for Disclosure of Brady/Giglio Material, supra note 164.
167. Telephone Interview with Tom Old, Assistant Prosecutor, Fifth Prosecutorial Dist.,
N.C. (Mar. 31, 2014).
168. Id
169. Telephone Interview with Megan Apple, Assistant Dist. Att'y, Buncombe Coty.,
N.C. (Mar. 31, 2014).
170. See GREENVILLE POLICE DEP'T, POLICIES & PROCEDURES MANUAL § 104.1.2 (rev.
Aug. 15, 2013).
171. Barker, OEA No. 1601-0143-10, slip op. at 8, 10, 13 (D.C. Office of Employee
App. Nov. 28, 2012) (quoting testimony by Roy McCleese, Chief of the Appellate Division
of the U.S. Attorneys Office); CONVICTION INTEGRITY PROJECT, CTR, ON THE ADMIN. OF
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Department forwards the officer's name to a Brady committee within the pros-
ecutor's office, which reviews the officer's records to decide whether she
should be included on the Brady list, 172 When a Brady officer is slated to testi-
fy, the prosecutor checks with the officer's supervisor for more details about
the nature of the misconduct and ultimately decides whether the officer's testi-
mony in that case would withstand the impeachment evidence that must be dis-
closed. 173
D. Group 4: "Access but No Disclosure" Regimes
In some jurisdictions, even though prosecutors have special access to the
personnel files, they do not put in place systems to seek out Brady material in
the files. This failure is sometimes attributable to ignorance of or disregard for
the law. Other times, the decision not to search the files is driven, or at least
abetted, by police departments and courts that treat the personnel files as a land
where Brady does not shine. In some jurisdictions, prosecutors, police, and the
courts effectively ignore Brady's application to personnel files, leaving defend-
ants to make do with whatever impeachment material they can scrounge from
the files via subpoena.
Some jurisdictions show no recognition that internal affairs findings have
implications for Brady, and this lack of awareness means that prosecutors never
learn of the misconduct they would be required to disclose. For example, re-
tired police lieutenant Richard Lisko asked the head of internal affairs at an un-
named Maryland agency about he agency's Brady policy for misconduct rec-
ords. "What's that?" the internal affairs commander asked. "You mean the gun
CRIMINAL LAW, ESTABLISHING CONVICTION INTEGRITY PROGRAMS IN PRoSECuToRS' OFFICES
26 n.16 (2012).
172. Lindsey, OEA No. 1601-0081-09, slip op. at 7 (D.C. Office of Employee App.
Oct. 28, 2011) (quoting testimony by Robert Hildum, Deputy Attorney General for Public
Safety for the D.C. Office of the Attorney General (OAG), indicating that the OAG reviews
the officer's misconduct and decides whether or not to use the officer's testimony). The list
is actually called the "Lewis List," in reference to Lewis v. United States, 408 A.2d 303, 307
(D.C. 1979).
173. Barker, OEA No. 1601-0143-10, slip op. at 8; Lindey, OEA No, 1601-0081-09,
slip op. at 4-5. Brad Weinsheimer, chair of the District of Columbia's Brady committee, tes-
tified to three types of misconduct on the list: (1) an arrest, (2) an ongoing investigation (be-
cause the officer may want to "curry favor" with the prosecution), and (3) "information that
we determine goes to veracity," such as "prior bad acts that relate to veracity, that relate to
truth telling." Lindsey, OEA No. 1601-0081-09, slip op. at 4 (quoting Weinsheimer's prior
testimony). Other jurisdictions around the country employ similar systems of tracking officer
misconduct. E.g., Plaintiffs' Response to Witness Jerome Gorman's Motion to Quash & for
Protective Order at 5-6, Callahan v. Unified Gov't, No. 2:11-CV-02621-KHV-KMH (D.
Kan. Mar. 20, 2013) (Wyandotte County, Kansas); CONVICTION INTEGRITY PROJECT, supra
note 171, at 26 (Jefferson Parish, Louisiana); Donnie Johnston, Culpeper Officer Pleads Not





law?"' 74 Lisko next asked the agency's legal director about the Brady policy
for disclosing police misconduct. "We don't have one," the attorney said. "We
require a subpoena, and then we challenge it in court."175
Another illustration of this lack of awareness can be seen in Michigan,
where the Commission on Law Enforcement Standards encountered a question
in 2007 about "what duties exist on the part of law enforcement agencies to
provide personnel files of police officers in pending criminal cases under the
Giglio rule."1 76 The Commission's attorney researched the question and re-
ported back a month later that no duty exists. "The Giglio case in Federal prac-
tice has not been extended to the state," he said, so it was "not an immediate
question that police or law enforcement officials need to be concerned with ...
relative to an affirmative duty to turn over personnel records."'77
Even where prosecutors acknowledge Brady's application to personnel
files, some have been slow to institute search and disclosure practices. For ex-
ample, a New York statute makes police personnel files confidential but per-
mits prosecutors to look in the files. 178 This special access thus foists a Brady
obligation on prosecutors to learn of misconduct in the files. But District Attor-
ney Gwen Wilkinson, of upstate Tompkins County, said she has no formal sys-
tem for learning of impeachment evidence in the personnel files-though she
plans to implement one soon.179 Indeed, her lack of a system for learning of
police misconduct was an issue in a civil rights suit brought by a police officer
in Tompkins County.180
174. Richard Lisko, Agency Policies Imperative to Disclose Brady v. Maryland Materi-
al to Prosecutors, POLICE CHIEF, Mar. 2011, at 12, 12 (internal quotation marks omitted).
This was a reference to the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1993. See also Tele-
phone Interview with Daisy Flores, supra note 151 ("[L]aw enforcement agencies don't un-
derstand. You say Brady to them, and they think it has to do with gun control.").
175. Lisko, supra note 174, at 12 (internal quotation marks omitted).
176. Mich. Comm'n on Law Enforcement Standards, Commission Meeting Minutes 11
(Mar. 14, 2007), https://www.michigan.gov/documents/mcoles/2_Minutes_3-14-2007_193
332_7.pdf As noted earlier, Giglio material is Brady material.
177. Id.
178. N.Y. Ctv. RiGHTs LAW § 50-a (McKinney 2014) ("The provisions of this section
shall not apply to any district attorney or his assistants ... or any agency of government
which requires the records . .. in the furtherance of their official functions.").
179. Telephone Interview with Gwen Wilkinson, Dist. Att'y, Tompkins Cnty., N.Y.
(Apr. 2, 2014). Wilkinson said that the "[rjequirements of Giglio are going to be much more
stringent" going forward. Id.
180. Examination Before Trial of Gwen Wilkinson at 30, Miller v, City of Ithaca, 914
F. Supp. 2d 242 (N-D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 3:10-cv-597) (reporting that no formal or informal
protocol exists for informing the prosecutor of police misconduct). The officer alleged that
he complained of racial discrimination in the police department and, in retaliation for this
complaint, police supervisors improperly told the district attorney about his disciplinary rec-
ord, even though there was no system in place to disclose this material in general. According
to the officer's suit, the district attorney then agreed to use the information to "provide a
sham 'opinion' concerning [the officer's] purported lack of credibility so as to allow [the
police department] to exact punishment against [the officer] for his complaints of discrimina-
tion." Amended Complaint at I1-12, Miller, 914 F. Supp. 2d 242 (No. 3: 10-cv-597).
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Similarly, prosecutors in Charleston, West Virginia, have access to police
misconduct files but have only recently begun looking in these files. Charles
Miller, a longtime federal prosecutor who joined the district attorney's office
several years ago, said he "quickly saw that we really weren't doing anything
with respect to Giglio" material in personnel files. '8 1 This realization prompted
him, with the district attorney's blessing, to ask all law enforcement agencies in
the county to "review the files of all their officers and notify us if there are any
substantiated allegations of misconduct." 82 Not all his colleagues in the state
do the same, he said.18 3
Some prosecutors have argued that, as a matter of doctrine, they are not re-
quired to learn of information in police personnel files. In Oregon, in 2013, one
prosecutor after another said as much in hearings before the legislature.
"[I]magine the resources that would be required to go into every one of those
personnel files on some periodic basis-I don't know, monthly-to see if there
had been some finding of dishonesty or some kind of actionable misconduct
that some defense attorney might consider impeachable," said one district at-
torney. "It's staggering."I 4 The first assistant to another district attorney add-
ed: "To ask prosecutors to be aware of the contents of their personnel files, to
be aware of commendations and of demerits contained within those personnel
files, is simply asking too much."'85 Still another district attorney insisted:
"How far do we have to delve into witnesses' lives, victims' lives, you know,
law enforcement's lives?"18 6 The executive director of the Oregon District At-
torneys Association wrote that such a search requirement was "a demand that
the government pry into everyone's life to see if there is anything there."'8 7
Notwithstanding these statements, a task force of Oregon prosecutors and law
enforcement leaders is now drafting guidelines on Brady's application to these
files. 188
In many jurisdictions, personnel file material is considered more of a dis-
covery matter than a Brady matter; courts discuss what a defendant must do to
access the files or to trigger in camera review, but do not ask what the prosecu-
181. Telephone Interview with Charles Miller, supra note 79.
182. Id
183. Id
184. Hearings on S.B. 492 Before the S. Comm. on Judiciary, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or.
2013) (testimony of Alex Gardner, Lane County District Att'y), video available at http://
oregon.granicus.com/MediaP]ayer.php?clip d=2020.
185. Id. (testimony of Jeff Howes, First Assistant, Multnomah County District Att'y Of-
fice).
186. Hearings on S.B. 492 Before the H. Comm. on Judiciary, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Or. 2013) (testimony of Scott Healy, Clackamas County District Att'y), video available at
http://oregon.granicus.com/MediaP]ayer.php?clip d=1348.
187. Id. (written statement of Doug Harcleroad, Executive Director, Oregon District
Att'ys Association) (recounting what "[o]ne experienced" district attorney said), available at
https://olis.leg.state.or.uslizl2013RI/Downloads/CommitteeMeetingDocument/25268.
188. E-mail from Eriks Gabliks, Dir., Or. Dep't of Pub. Safety Standards & Training, to
author (Mar. 23, 2014) (on file with author).
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for must do to search the files. "There are relatively few cases involving the
right of a defendant to have the prosecution review personnel files of law en-
forcement officers," explained the Delaware Supreme Court, after carrying out
a nationwide survey of the case law. "Nevertheless, those decisions are almost
unanimous in holding that in response to a specific motion, or upon subpoena
duces tecum, the prosecution is required to review the identified personnel files
for Brady material."18 9 Unfortunately, instead of considering the prosecutor's
duty toward these files, court opinions focus on what the defendant must do to
gain direct access or to trigger in camera review. For example, a leading New
York case holds that a defendant who wants access to the personnel files should
at least advance "some factual predicate which would make it reasonably likely
that the file will bear such fruit and that the quest for its contents is not merely
a desperate grasping at a straw."190 Other courts have adopted similar threshold
requirements for the personnel files, commonly requiring the defendant to es-
tablish "a factual basis for the requested files" before he can trigger in camera
review or access the file himself.' '
The demotion of the personnel file issue from Brady's constitutional status
to that of a mere discovery request has a number of problematic implications.
The most important implication of this discovery approach is that it shifts from
the prosecutor to the defendant the difficult burden of justifying why the file's
confidentiality should be pierced. Under the discovery approach, the burden
falls on the defendant to make a threshold showing about what the files contain
before the court will even consider reviewing the files. The paradox is that the
defendant must already know something about what is in the file before he can
get help learning what is actually in the file. If he knows nothing about the
file-as one might expect of such a confidential source-the defendant will get
189, Snowden v. State, 672 A.2d 1017, 1023 (Del. 1996). But some courts do not agree.
Last summer, New York's high court said, in dicta, "While prosecutors should not be dis-
couraged from asking their police witnesses about potential misconduct, if they feel such a
conversation would be prudent, they are not required to make this inquiry to fulfill their
Brady obligations." People v. Garrett, 18 NE.3d 722, 732 (N.Y. 2014) (discussing, in the
context of a civil rights suit, evidence known to the officer but not to the prosecutor).
190. People v. Gissendanner, 399 N.E.2d 924, 928 (N.Y. 1979). But see March v. State,
859 P.2d 714, 718 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993) (holding that "a good faith basis for asserting that
the materials in question may lead to the disclosure of favorable evidence" is enough to trig-
ger review).
191. Snowden, 672 A.2d at 1023 (citing State v. Kaszubinski, 425 A,2d 711, 714 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980)); see Rodgers v. State, 547 S.W.2d 419, 429 (Ark. 1977) (en
bane) ("But, in the exercise of discretion, the necessity for a defendant's searching confiden-
tial matter must be weighed against the public policy of confidentiality or secrecy. This, the
trial court may do by an in camera inspection of the material sought." (citations omitted));
Dempsey v. State, 615 S.E.2d 522, 525 (Ga. 2005) (ruling that the defendant has the "burden
of showing that the personnel files were not the subject of a fishing expedition, but were rel-
evant to ... guilt, innocence or appropriate penalty"); Patterson v. State, 381 S.E.2d 754,
755 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) ("When the defense seeks to discover the personnel files of an in-
vestigating law enforcement officer, some showing of need must be made." (quoting Cargill
v. State, 340 S.E.2d 891, 911 (Ga. 1986), overruled in part by Manzano v. State, 651 S.E.2d
661 (Ga. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). See generally Ghent, supra note 31.
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no help from the court in learning more. Were this treated as a Brady problem
rather than a discovery problem, it would at least be the prosecutor's responsi-
bility to grapple with this catch-22, and prosecutors have shown somewhat
more capacity for doing so than defendants.9 2
In sum, whether they think Brady is a gun control law, a problem not press-
ing enough-or too difficult-to solve, or a matter of mere discovery,
these Group 4 jurisdictions fail to acknowledge Brady's application to police
personnel files. In short, they treat the files as a Brady blind spot.
III. THE BRADYBATTLE WITHIN THE PROSECUTION TEAM
Beyond the access issues discussed above, there is another significant dy-
namic that impedes Brady's application to police misconduct: the conflict with-
in the prosecution team. Even when prosecutors learn of police misconduct, po-
lice officers spend much energy pressuring them not to disclose it. This
pressure is motivated by the fear that disclosure will lead to severe employment
consequences for the officers. Police officers and their unions have used litiga-
tion, legislation, and informal political pressure to mount a campaign against
Brady's application to their files. This conflict between prosecutors and police
officers is easily overlooked, however, because prosecutors and police officers
are widely seen as forming a cohesive prosecution team. Indeed, the Supreme
Court's Brady case law is premised on the assumption that "the prosecutor has
the means to discharge the government's Brady responsibility if he will" by
putting in place "procedures and regulations" to bring forth Brady material
known to any member of the prosecution team, including the police. 93 But the
conflict within the prosecution team undermines that assumption and constrains
the prosecutor's ability to fulfill his constitutional obligations.
The battle over Brady's application to personnel files has also created divi-
sions within police departments. Police officers suspect police management of
using the Brady process to punish officers outside of the departments' official
disciplinary systems and their attendant procedural protections. For officers,
Brady has become an issue not just of defendants' due process rights but also of
their own due process rights, as officers struggle to protect themselves from the
uses and abuses of the Brady-cop designation. This aspect of due process helps
explain why police officers and their advocates take such a hard line against
Brady's application to these files. Indeed, the frequent failure to apply Brady to
these personnel files cannot be understood without accounting for this conflict,
which has riven the prosecution team.
192. See supra Part II.A.
193. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 438 (1995) (quoting Giglio v. United States, 405
U.S. 150, 154 (1972)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
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A. The Prosecutor's (and the Police Chief's) Brady Power
Brady's application to law enforcement personnel files is an issue very
much on the minds of the police. "O]ne of the most important issues facing
law enforcement is the one surrounding the Brady List," declared Jim Parks,
then-president of Arizona's largest police association. "[Wie have been fighting
this issue because there appears to be no set standard for placing an officer on
the list, removing an officer from the list, or. . . defining [who] makes those
decisions."1 9 4 Another officer railed against his placement on a Brady list, call-
ing it "tantamount to being placed on a government blacklist, which when pub-
licized to prospective law enforcement employers effectively excludes the
blacklisted individual from his chosen occupation in law enforcement." 95 Still
another officer derided it as a "blacklist[]" that violates due process and goes
beyond any "obligation of law." 1 96 Prosecutors, too, have acknowledged the
gravity of the Brady designation, ominously referring to a Brady-list placement
as "the kiss of death."1 97
But what, specifically, is a Brady list, and why does it threaten these offic-
ers? Brady lists, Giglio lists, liars lists, asterisk lists, potential impeachment
disclosure databases, and law enforcement integrity databases are all terms
used to describe the mechanism by which prosecutors within an office alert
each other to an officer's credibility problems.198 There is a wide range in who
maintains these lists-police or prosecutors-and in how the lists are con-
structed, with some providing only vague warnings that a credibility problem
exists and others specifying the details of the misconduct. Strictly speaking,
placement on the Brady list does not bar an officer from testifying. Depending
on the severity of the impeachment material and the value of the officer's tes-
timony in the case, the prosecutor may still decide to call the officer as a wit-
ness. But the Brady-cop designation immediately puts a question mark on the
officer's ability to testify, and that question mark has severe employment con-
194. Jim Parks, President's Message: Brady ("Liar's") List a Most Important Issue,
AZCOPS SPEAKS (Ariz. Conference of Police & Sheriffs, Local 7077, Tucson, Ariz.), Spring
2004, at 2, 2
195. Complaint for Damages & Injunctive Relief for Violation of Individual Civil
Rights & Liberties at 4, Tillotson v. Dumanis, No. lOCV1343WQH AJB, 2012 WL 667046
(S.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2012); see also Parks, supra note 194, at 2 ("The unjustified placement of
an officer on a Brady list is, in many cases, a career ender. An officer on the list is often
barred from holding any position which might result in the officer testifying in court. Offic-
ers lose the ability to promote or transfer and are stigmatized as 'liars."').
196. Complaint for Damages & Injunctive Relief for Violation of Individual Civil
Rights & Liberties with Supplemental State Law Claims at 7, 9, Nazir v. Cnty. of L.A., No.
CVIO 6546-MRP (AGR) (C.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2010).
197. Telephone Interview with Brian Kramer, Exec. Dir., Office of the State Att'y for
the 8th Judicial Dist., Fla. (Mar. 31, 2014).
198. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3305.5 (West 2014) ("'Brady list' means any system, in-
dex, list, or other record containing the names of peace officers whose personnel files are
likely to contain evidence of dishonesty or bias, which is maintained by a prosecutorial
agency or office in accordance with the holding in Brady v. Maryland. . . .").
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sequences. An officer who cannot be counted on to testify also cannot be
counted on to make arrests, investigate cases, or carry out any other police
functions that might lead to the witness stand. Brady cops may thus find them-
selves fast-tracked for termination and hard-pressed to find future work.1 9
Considering the grave employment consequences, one might expect strong
substantive and procedural protections to guard against mistakenly or unfairly
placing an officer on the Brady list. But that is not the case. Unlike in police
department disciplinary proceedings, which provide many procedural protec-
tions to accused officers, prosecutors can make Brady-cop designations based
on flimsy evidence and without giving officers an opportunity to contest the al-
legations beforehand or to appeal the decisions afterward.2)0 Even if, on ap-
peal, the officer overturns the misconduct finding that landed him on the Brady
list, the prosecutor can continue to label the officer as a Brady cop if he doubts
the officer's credibility.20' And forget whatever progressive discipline system
might govern the traditional punishment of police misconduct202: a prosecutor
can put an officer on the Brady list for a small, first-time offense and leave her
there for life without giving her any chance to clear her name.
The sense of unfairness engendered by this process is only exacerbated by
the potential for police management o misuse Brady in clashes with police la-
bor. Not without justification, officers suspect prosecutors of using the Brady
199. Telephone Interview with Richard Lisko, Program Manager, Int'l Ass'n of Chiefs
of Police (Feb. 21, 2014) ("[The] challenge for many police chiefs and sheriffs: 'I have a guy
who is now prevented from testifying. What do I do with him?"'). As the president of the
Califomia Police Chiefs Association recently said, "Most departments up and down the state
don't have the ability to put someone in a non-enforcement position for the rest of their ca-
reer. . . . Unfortunately, they really can't stay employed in the law enforcement profession."
Melody Gutierrez & Kim Minugh, Califbrnia Police Unions Fight Discipline of Officers
Under Prosecutors' Lists, MERCED SUN-STAR (Sept. 12, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www
.mercedsunstar.com/news/state/article3278731.html.
200. See United States v. Olsen, 704 F.3d 1172, 1182 (9th Cir. 2013) ("[This cir-
cuit ... has held materials from ongoing investigations to be favorable under Brady.");
Parks, supra note 194, at 2 (justifying his Arizona police union's fight against Brady lists
"because there appears to be no set standard for placing an officer on the list, removing an
officer from the list, or.. . defining [who] makes those decisions"); Mike Carter, Prosecu-
tors Keep List of Problem Officers, SEATTLE TIMEs (June 24, 2007, 12:00 AM), http://
seattletimes.com/htmllocalnews/2003760490_bradycops24m.html (recounting the president
of the Seattle Police Officers' Guild's belief that only information about a "rare disciplinary
finding of dishonesty against an officer" should be turned over, and reporting that the prose-
cutor's office has nonetheless turned over information about officers not yet disciplined).
201. Complaint at 4-6, Garza v. City of Yakima, No. CV-13-3031-LRS (E.D. Wash.
Mar. 22, 2013) (opposing an officer's placement on the Brady list while challenging disci-
plinary findings); Complaint at 4-5, Neri v. Cnty. of Stanislaus Dist. Att'y Office, No. 1:10-
cv-00823-AWI-GSA (E.D. Cal. May 11, 2010) (contesting disclosure of unsustained allega-
tions as Brady material); see also Complaint for Damages & Demand for Jury Trial at 8-9,
Riley v. City of Richmond, 3:13-cv-04752-MMC (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11,2013) (alleging that the
plaintiff officer remained on the Brady list even after being acquitted of the charges that
originally led to placement on the list).
202. E.g., N.J. OFFICE OF THE ATT'Y GEN., INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES 8
(rev. July 2014), available at http://www.nj.gov/oag/dcj/agguide.
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designation to aid police chiefs in punishing disfavored officers. In the District
of Columbia, for example, the police department apparently asked the prosecu-
tor's office to make Brady-cop determinations in order to facilitate the firing of
officers who were otherwise protected from termination by the statute of limita-
tions on their misconduct.2 03 In Washington State, an officer claimed he landed
on the Brady list because the department wanted to punish him without navi-
gating the obstacles of the formal disciplinary process.204 His federal civil
rights suit resulted in reinstatement and an $812,500 settlement.205 In Texas,
police officers accused the Ellis County district attorney of labeling one of their
colleagues a Brady cop in order to help the police chief fire the officer.20 6 The
officers claimed the Brady label rendered their colleague "unfit for duty" and,
in so doing, made him ineligible for the labor protections he would otherwise
have received.20 7 In an interview, Patrick Wilson, the Ellis County district at-
torney, denied the allegations and called them irrelevant: "[Ejven if the chief
woke up one morning and like a lightning bolt from the sky said, 'I'm going to
screw with this officer today and tell the D.A. he's a liar, with no basis at all,'
once the chief has said that, the bell has rung. That's how liberal my view of
Brady [is]."2 08
The alignment between prosecutors and police chiefs may also be seen in
police management organizations' endorsements of Brady's application to per-
sonnel files. In 2009, the International Association of Chiefs of Police advised
its members of the "affirmative duty" to seek out impeachment material, in-
cluding material contained in personnel files.209 Another example comes from
the Idaho Peace Officer Standards and Training group, led by sheriffs and pros-
ecutors who are appointed by the governor to the board. This group has empha-
sized that "[law enforcement agencies have the responsibility to ensure prose-
cutors are informed of an officer's past record of dishonesty in reports or
conduct impacting truthfulness."2 10 Similarly, a panel of prosecutors, police
chiefs, and academics recommended more robust Brady policies, including
203. See Barker, OEA No. 1601-0143-10, slip op. at 13-14 (D.C. Office of Employee
App. Nov. 28, 2012); Lindsey, OEA No. 1601-0081-09, slip op. at 11 (D.C. Office of Em-
ployee App. Oct. 28, 2011).
204. First Amended Complaint for Damages & Injunctive Relief at 2, Wender v.
Snohomish Cnty., No. CV 07-197 Z (W.D. Wash. Oct. 25, 2007), 2007 WL 5043448.
205. Press Release, MacDonald Hoague & Bayless, Fired Mountlake Terrace Police
Sergeant Who Criticized Drug War Reaches $812,500 Settlement with Municipalities (Jan.
12, 2009) (on file with author).
206. Telephone Interview with Patrick M. Wilson, Cnty. & Dist. Att'y, Ellis Cnty., Tex.
(Apr. 8, 2014).
207. Id.
208. Id.; see also Telephone interview with Timothy Donnelly, supra note 145 ("The
same officers keep coming back. Some are hard to get rid of, to fire. Departments want to
send them to us. I say this is a management issue, not a criminal [one].").
209. NAT'L LAw ENFORCEMENT POLICY CTR., INT'L Ass'N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, BRADY
DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS 4 (2009).
210. The Need for Truth: Behind Brady & Giglio, INTEGRITY BULL. (Idaho Peace Of-
ficer Standards & Training, Meridian, Idaho), May 2012, at 1, 1-2.
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those pertaining to police misconduct records.21 1 Other oups representing po-
lice management have also endorsed such Brady lists. These examples sug-
gest that prosecutors and police managers often share common interests in
Brady's application to these files-interests that conflict with those of police
officers.
B. Police Officer Pushback
While officers can neither prevent prosecutors from deeming them Brady
cops nor force prosecutors to reverse their Brady decisions, officers can pres-
sure prosecutors to use their discretion in the officers' favor. Officers have
spent a great deal of effort in such attempts, using litigation, legislation, and in-
formal political pressure to blunt Brady's application to their files, and this
campaign has met with some success.
1. Litigation
Police officers have employed a range of causes of action to fight back
against the Brady-cop designation. One claim is defamation, in which an of-
ficer alleges that prosecutors and their police chief collaborators damaged the
officer's reputation by placing him on a Brady list. 2 13 Defamation claims are
sometimes paired with claims of breach of contract and tortious interference
with contract. In one case, an officer resigned from the police department on
the condition that his Brady. problems not be revealed to prospective employ-
ers.2 14 But, on the verge of landing a new job, the officer learned that the pros-
ecutor in his old jurisdiction was planning to share the officer's Brady status
with the prosecutor in the officer's new jurisdiction. 2 1 5 This prompted a suit for
defamation, breach of contract, invasion of privacy, false light, and tortious in-
terference with contract-a suit that the officer promptly lost on summary
211. CONVICTION INTEGRITY PROJECT, supra note 171, at 26 ("DA offices should also
establish a database or network for tracking Brady and/or Giglio information as it relates to
key witnesses, such as police officers ,,. who will potentially work with a prosecutor in the
future.").
212. See WASH. Ass'N OF SHERIFFS & POLICE CHIEFS, supra note 159, at 3; Colo. Ass'n
of Chiefs of Police et a., supra note 135, at 1-3.
213. See, e.g., Walters v. Cnty. of Maricopa, No. CV 04-1920-PHX-NVW, 2006 WL
2456173, at *1 (D. Ariz. Aug. 22, 2006); Giana Magnoli, Ex-Santa Maria Police Officer
Files Lawsuit Claiming Wrongful Termination, NOOZHAWK (Aug. 19, 2012, 11:39 PM),
http://www.noozhawk.coi/article/081912_firedpolice_officer-sues-santamaria; Rebecca
Woolington, Cornelius Officer Files Tort Against City, Claims Officials Recommended His
Placement on List Questioning Credibility, OREGONIAN (Aug. 20, 2013, 8:18 PM), bttp://
www.oregonlive.com/forest-grove/index.ssf/2013/08/cornelius officer filestort a.httni.
214. Lackey v. Lewis Cnty., No. C09-5145RJB, 2009 WL 3294848, at *4 (W.D. Wash.
Oct. 9, 2009).
215. Id, at *5.
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judgment,216 Some officers have even sought-unsuccessfully-to enjoin pros-
ecutors and police departments from disseminating Brady information about
them.217 These suits are often frivolous to begin with and made doubly and tri-
ply so by courts' reluctance to interfere with prosecutors' Brady decisions and
courts' deference to the doctrines of absolute and qualified immunity. But the
suits nonetheless illustrate the intensity of this conflict within the prosecution
team.
Another common cause of action is retaliation, which requires the plaintiff
to prove she suffered an adverse employment action as a result of some pro-
tected activity.218 Officers claim to have been placed on Brady lists for criticiz-
ing the district attorney's policies in the local newspaper,2 19 failing to support
the prosecutor's reelection camp 22i ,0 providing testimony that was truthful
but unhelpful to the prosecution, and complaining to city officials about cor-
ruption in the police department.222 In one retaliation case in federal court, a
narcotics detective alleged that the district attorney placed him on the Brady list
for raising questions about improprieties on the part of one of the district attor-
ney's employees.223 According to the disputed facts in the court's denial of
summary judgment, the prosecutor threatened to put the detective on the Brady
list unless the detective apologized and was transferred out of the narcotics
22425unit. The case settled soon thereafter.225 The detective's lawyer called "the
Brady listing ... an abuse of the prosecutor's power."226 And it certainly is
216. Id. at *11-13. These suits illustrate the practical, if not legal, dilemmas facing
prosecutors and police chiefs: keep quiet in the name of labor peace or speak up in the inter-
ests of Brady. In this case, the sheriffs office chose the former, while the prosecutor chose
the latter. Id. at *5.
217. Doyle v. Lee, 272 P.3d 256, 258-59 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012).
218. Robert Roy, Annotation, Right to Jury Trial in Action for Retaliatory Discharge
from Employment, 52 A.LR.4rTH 1141, § I[a] (West 2015).
219. First Amended Complaint at 5, Bamett v. Marquis, 16 F. Supp. 3d 1218 (D. Or.
2014) (No. 3:13-cv-01588-HZ).
220. Doyle, 272 P.3d at 258.
221, Telephone Interview with Chris Bugbee, Att'y (Mar. 18, 2014) (explaining that
federal prosecutors "basically implor[ed]" county prosecutors to create a Brady list and place
his police officer client on it because of unhelpful testimony).
222. Complaint for Damages at 7, Monico v. City of Cornelius, No. 3:13-cv-02129-HZ
(D. Or. Dec. 2, 2013); see also Rodriguez v. District of Columbia, No. 2011 CA 7096 B
(D.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 1, 2012) (discussing retaliation). In another case, a governmental re-
view board in Arizona found indications in 2013 that a police chief used Brady to retaliate
against officers who sued him, but it discontinued its review because of a lack of evidence
and a policy of "encourag[ing] police leaders to contribute information to the Brady Lists."
Arizona Peace Officer Standards & Training Board, Minutes of Special Complaint Sub-
committee 1-2 (Nov. 20, 2013) (on file with author).
223. Walters v. Cnty. of Maricopa, No. CV 04-1920-PHX NVW, 2006 WL 2456173, at
*3-4 (D. Ariz. Aug. 22, 2006).
224. Id. at *4.
225. Notice of Settlement, Walters, No. CV 04-1920-PHX NVW.
226. E-mail from Robert Kavanagh, Att'y, to author (Mar. 6, 2014) (on file with au-
thor),
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troubling to think that placement on the list could hinge on an apology or a
transfer, neither of which seems connected to the officer's credibility. Indeed,
one Brady list swept so broadly that a judge was placed on the list for his han-
dling of a search warrant application. 227 That a judge could land on a Brady list
raises questions about how far the Brady lists have drifted from their original
purpose.
In addition to these damages suits, police litigation has taken aim at the
mechanics of Brady tracking. In one case, a police department succeeded in
overturning a trial court's order that three officers provide their birthdates to the
prosecution so that the prosecution could check the officers' criminal histo-
ries. 22 8 Other litigation has targeted public defenders who assemble databases
of officer credibility problems gleaned not only from criminal proceedings and
internal affairs investigations but also from newspapers, social media, civil
suits, and divorce proceedings.229
Still another strand of this litigation campaign targets the employment con-
sequences of the Brady designation, rather than the Brady designation itself.
Even if the officers cannot shake the Brady label, they can sometimes stave off
termination. This can create a difficult situation for police management, which
may find itself stuck with an officer who cannot testify because the prosecutor
does not rust her, but who also cannot be terminated because the officer fought
off her termination through arbitration. 230 In Washington State, for example, a
deputy fired for twenty-nine instances of misconduct, including some involving
dishonesty, appealed his termination.23 1 The arbitrator declared the termination
excessive and reversed it. 232 The trial court affirmed the arbitrator, but the
227. Gary Grado, Tempe Judge's Credibility Questioned, E. VALLEY TRIB. (Oct. 6,
2011, 6:01 AM), http://www.eastvalleytribune.com/news/article 3724d038-4963-536a-9fD2
-25f0fla6e7fe.html (reporting that the judge's comments about the warrant application
caused the prosecutor to question the judge's credibility).
228. Garden Grove Police Dep't v. Superior Court, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 642, 642-43 (Ct.
App. 2001).
229. Coronado Police Officers Ass'n v. Carroll, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 553, 556 (Ct. App.
2003); see San Diego Public Defender's Office "Police Practices Program" to Receive De-
fender Program of the Year Award, Bus. WIRE, May 4, 2001, available at http://www
.thefreelibrary.com/San+Diego+Public+-Defender/o27s+Office+%60%60Police+Practices+
Program%27%27+to...-a074093934; see also Mark H. Moore et al, The Best Defense Is No
Offense: Preventing Crime Through Effective Public Defense, 29 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 57, 67 (2004) (discussing the Los Angeles Public Defender's database).
230. Telephone Interview with Robert W. Hood, Dir., Cnty. Prosecution & Violent
Crime Div., Ass'n of Prosecuting Att'ys (Mar. 14, 2014) (noting the complications that oc-
cur when a Brady cop is reinstated by order of a court). "What does the prosecutor now do
with that officer?" Hood asked. "I don't know that it is the prosecutor's place to tell the po-
lice department what to do with its assignments." Id.
231. Kitsap Cnty. Deputy Sheriffs Guild v. Kitsap Cnty., 165 P.3d 1266, 1267, 1271
(Wash. Ct. App. 2007), rev'd, 219 P.3d 675 (Wash. 2009) (en bane); see Elliot Spector,
Should Police Officers Who Lie Be Terminated as a Matter ofPublic Policy?, POLICE CHIEF,
(Apr. 2008), http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=print
display&articleid=1458&issueid-42008.
232. Kitsap Cnty. Deputy Sherif's Guild, 219 P.3d at 677.
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Court of Appeals reversed on the grounds that it was against public policy to
force a department to employ a dishonest cop. 233 Ultimately, however, the state
supreme court reinstated the officer, holding that the legislature had not articu-
lated an explicit public policy in favor of making honesty a job requirement for
officers.23 A year later, the legislature fixed that omission by statute, but the
episode reveals the breadth and complexity of Brady's implications for em-
ployment law, even when all parties act in good faith.235
2. Legislation
The next form of pushback involves legislation, While statutes in many
states already protect he confidentiality of police personnel files, officers and
unions have pushed for legislation that would specifically address the employ-
ment consequences of Brady's application to their files.236 Effective the first
day of 2014, a California statute provides that adverse employment action
"shall not be undertaken by any public agency against any public safety officer
solely because that officer's name has been placed on a Brady list, or [because]
the officer's name may otherwise be subject to disclosure pursuant to Brady v.
Maryland."237 The legislation still allows police departments to discipline of-
ficers for the misconduct underlying a Brady designation, but he mere fact that
the prosecutor or the police chief said the officer has a Brady problem cannot
be used to support any adverse employment action.
California's new law helps prevent Brady from being used to punish offic-
ers outside of a department's formal disciplinary channels. The law shifts the
costs of misusing the Brady designation from the police officer to the police
department. If the prosecutor declares an officer to be a Brady cop but has no
grounds to support that designation, police management will not be able to dis-
cipline the officer because it will not be able to prove the misconduct and, ac-
cording to the new legislation, the prosecutor's Brady decision is no longer
grounds to support a disciplinary action. Instead, police management will find
itself in the uncomfortable position of having to employ an officer who can nei-
ther testify nor be terminated.23 Meanwhile, the officer will hold on to his job.
233. Id. at 677.
234. Id. at 680-81.
235. WASH. REV. CoDE § 43.101.021 (2014); see NAT'L LAW ENFORCEMENT POLICY
CTR.,supra note 209, at 5 n.22; Reimund, supra note 159, at 3.
236. See supra Part IIA,
237. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3305.5 (West 2014),
238. Id. ("This section shall not prohibit a public agency from taking punitive action .. .
against a public safety officer based on the underlying acts or omissions for which that of-
ficer's name was placed on a Brady list.. . .").
239. See supra notes 230-35 and accompanying text; see also Gutierrez & Minugh, su-
pra note 199 ("Bill proponents say under the current system, an officer may be suspended
for 30 days following an internal investigation into misconduct, but subsequently fired when
placed on the Brady list. Proponents argue that essentially puts employment decisions in the
hands of the district attorney's office. Police union officials say the bill requires agencies to
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Not surprisingly, lobbying associations representing local government and
police management fought against this legislation, describing it as a "dangerous
public safety precedent"24 0 that would place "unnecessar restrictions on a
public agency's ability to discipline a public safety officer.
In Maryland, a similar law went into effect in October 2014.242 The legis-
lation was initially opposed by police management groups, including the Mary-
land Association of Counties, which saw it as an attempt to limit the preroga-
tive of "Chiefs and Sheriffs . . . to transfer or reassign an officer if testimony
integrity issues arise."243 However, police management agreed to support a re-
vised version of the bill that explicitly permitted the use of Brady lists, while
prohibiting agencies from taking punitive action based solely on an officer's
inclusion on the list.244 More such legislation is sure to follow in other states.
3. Political pressure
Beyond litigation and legislation, police officers have tried to blunt the
consequences of Brady by exerting informal political pressure on prosecutors
and police chiefs. While prosecutors may use the Brady power to exert much
influence over officers' careers, prosecutors are also dependent on officers to
bring in new cases, conduct follow-up investigations, and carry out various
other tasks required for successful prosecutions. s For elected prosecutors, the
reliance on the police is even greater because officers make up an important
electoral constituency. A district attorney who alienates the police rank and file
may find herself out of a job. These factors give the police some leverage
against prosecutors' misuse of Brady.
introduce placement on Brady lists into a disciplinary hearing only after a decision on 'guilt'
has been made, akin to introducing evidence at the sentencing phase of a criminal trial.").
240. Press Release, League of Cal. Cities, Brady List Bill Now on Governor's Desk,
Veto Request Letters Needed (Aug. 30, 2013), http://www.cacities.org/Top/News/News
-Articles/2013/August/Brady-List-Bill-Now-on-GovernorE2%80%99s-Desk,-Veto-Reque.
241. Letter from Eraina Ortega, Cal. State Ass'n of Cntys., Natasha Karl, League of
Cal. Cities, & Julianne Broyles, Cal. Ass'n of Joint Powers Auths., to Loni Hancock, Chair,
Cal. Senate Pub. Safety Comm. (Mar. 27, 2013), available at http://blob.capitoltrack.com
/13blobs/dbdl9c31-1031-48ce-bOeO-733b60elacO7.
242. MD. CODE. ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 3-106.1 (LexisNexis 2014).
243. Memorandum from Natasha Mehu, Md. Ass'n of Cntys., to Appropriations Comm.
(Feb. 18, 2014), available at http://www.ciclt.net/ul/mdcounties/SB06S6JPR.pdf.
244. Natasha Mehu, 2014 End of Session Wrap-Up: Public Safety & Corrections, Mo.
Ass'N COUNTIES (Apr. 9, 2014), http://conduitstreet.mdcounties.org/2014/04/09/2014-end
-of-session-wrap-up-public-safety-corrections.
245. Telephone Interview with Jerry Coleman, supra note 20; Telephone Interview with
Rick Dusterhoft, supra note 148 ("The courts . . . put us between a rock and [a] hard place
[with] all these protections for the unions and the officers and all these disclosure require-
ments."); Telephone Interview with Joshua Marquis, Dist. Att'y, Clatsop Cnty., Or. (Feb. 25,
2014) ("We really are in an extraordinarily difficult situation .... We're often put in an ad-
versarial position with the very people we have to rely on to develop our cases, . . ."),
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The signs of the officers' influence can be seen in the willingness of some
prosecutors to inject due process protections into the Brady process. Prosecu-
tors' due process concessions include giving officers an opportunity to provide
their side of the story before a Brady decision is made, allowing officers a
chance to appeal the Brady decision within the district attorney's office, pledg-
ing to reconsider a Brady designation if the disciplinary action upon which it is
based is reversed on appeal, and even providing for the sunsetting of an of-
ficer's Brady status, pegged to the police department's records retention sched-
ule.24 6 In other cases, concessions to due process may consist of the prosecu-
tor's promise to rely only on sustained complaints rather than mere speculation,
or to limit what information the prosecutor will disclose, such as summaries of
the misconduct versus the underlying documents themselves.24 7 It is worth em-
phasizing, however, that these concessions are entirely voluntary, and the pros-
ecutor can violate any of them in the name of Brady compliance.
Police officers and their unions also exert much pressure on police chiefs
and thus indirectly on the Brady process.24 8 Observers claim that the stronger
the union, the weaker Brady's application to personnel files. Bill Amato, who
led Maricopa County's development of a Brady system and now serves as
counsel for the Tempe Police Department, said East Coast colleagues are often
"reluctant to become more aggressive in this area" because of the strength of
their police unions.249 He recalled a debate with an attorney at one such de-
partment, where prosecutors were not allowed access to the personnel files.
246. Press Release, League of Cal. Cities, supra note 240; see also MARICOPA CNTY.
ArT'Y OFFICE, supra note 154, § 6.4; Telephone Interview with Bill Amato, supra note 157;
Memorandum from Peter W. Heed, supra note 115; Gutierrez & Minugh, supra note 199;
Andrew Scott & Nuno Tavares, How the Placer County DSA Negotiated a Brady Protocol,
PORAC LEGAL DEF. FUND (May 1, 2011, 12:00 PM), http://poracIdf.org/news/detail29
("The District Attorney also agreed to review the Brady Database at least once a year and to
entertain requests by an officer to be removed from the list based on new information. The
protocol also adopted [the union's] language, making the lawful destruction of a peace of-
ficer's records-pursuant to the five-year destruction rule-a basis for requesting the of-
ficer's removal from the list.").
247. This concession regarding summaries gives the officer a chance to fight off de-
fense subpoenas for the more detailed, raw documentation. WAsH. Ass'N OF PROSECUTING
Arr'Ys, supra note 159, at 5; Parks, supra note 194 (citing a candidate for district attorney's
pledge to work with officers to create statewide standards for Brady lists, under which the
decision to place an officer on the Brady list "would not be the County Attorney's decision
alone" but rather would be made by "[a] panel, upon hearing all the evidence"); Memoran-
dum from Benjamin R. David, supra note 164, at 4; Thadeus Greenson, Kalis Arrest Shines
Spotlight on DA's Brady Policy; DA's Office Has Written Policy for Dealing with Officers
with Character Issues, TIMES-STANDARD (Apr. 22, 2011, 12:01 AM PDT), http://www
,times-standard.com/ci_ 17907205 (disclosing that the policy in Humboldt County, Califor-
nia, provides that "officers and departments shall .... be given 15 days to respond in writing
or during an in-person meeting with the district attorney to discuss the allegations or support-
ing materials").
248. Telephone Interview with Scott Durfee, supra note 147 ("The police chief is be-
tween a rock and a hard place. Totally. I don't envy him in that spot.").
249. Telephone Interview with Bill Amato, supra note 152.
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"Her entire defense was, 'My chief would not survive this,"' Amato said.250
David O'Neil, a captain with the Brentwood Police Department in Tennessee,
also connected union power to the Brady issue. The "at-will status of employ-
ees in southern states makes it a lot easier for officers to be fired," he said.
"When we have a bad officer, it doesn't linger on.... We're not going to toler-
ate it." 251 Such observations suggest the influence police officers and unions
can have, not just on the employment consequences of Brady but also on the
application of the doctrine itself.
The Brady battle within the prosecution team is not something cases or
scholarship have taken into account, perhaps because it often simmers below
the level of reported decisions. But the competing interests of prosecutors, po-
lice chiefs, and police officers-interests both legitimate and illegitimate-take
on constitutional significance insofar as they affect Brady. This conflict within
the prosecution team helps explain why there is so much resistance to Brady's
application to police personnel files. Is it any wonder that officers have mobi-
lized against Brady, given the unreviewable prosecutorial discretion, the mo-
tives and opportunities for abuse, and the severe employment consequences of
the Brady-designation process? This battle within the prosecution team sug-
gests why officers might think the best way to protect themselves is on the front
end: by denying prosecutors access to the files.
IV. PROTECTIONS FOR POLICE PERSONNEL FILES VIOLATE BRADY
Given the importance of the misconduct information to defendants and the
potential abuses of the Brady system that threaten officers, it might be tempting
to employ some type of balancing system that would keep the personnel rec-
ords confidential unless a court orders them disclosed. But such balancing sys-
tems wind up violating core aspects of the Brady doctrine. Worse still, the bal-
ancing systems inflict this damage on Brady in furtherance of policy goals that
are not really in the public interest.
This Part argues that records of police misconduct do not deserve the con-
fidentiality protections afforded to child abuse records and other sensitive doc-
uments, regardless of courts' analogies to those sensitive records. Officers are
public officials serving in positions of great public trust. Official documenta-
250. Id.
251. Interview with David O'Neil, Captain, Brentwood Police Dept., Tenn. (Apr. 29,
2014). The collective bargaining agreement with one New Mexico union permits Brady ac-
cess to the otherwise confidential personnel fi es. Agreement Between the State of New
Mexico and New Mexico Motor Transportation Employee's Association: August 12, 2009




tion of their misconduct should be accessible to the public, or at least to prose-
cutors. This Part further argues that, even if police misconduct deserves some
protected status, the traditional methods of balancing Brady against evidentiary
privileges do not work in the personnel file context. This failure results both
from the officer's special status as a witness and a prosecution team member
and from specific procedural flaws in systems that purport to balance Brady
against police privacy.
A. Brady Versus Other Evidentiary Privileges
State courts have struggled, in a variety of criminal cases, to balance Brady
against evidentiary privileges, including those protecting child abuse, rape cri-
sis counseling, medical, psychiatric, social services, juvenile delinquency, edu-
cational, and executively privileged records.252 In balancing the disclosure
mandated by Brady against the protections provided by these privileges, courts
frequently turn to the Supreme Court's 1987 decision in Pennsylvania v. Ritch-
ie." In Ritchie, a defendant charged with sexually abusing his daughter sub-
poenaed records from the county's Department of Children and Youth Ser-
vices, hoping the records would contain information that could be used to
impeach the victim's testimony.2 54 The government refused to release the rec-
ords because they were made confidential by statute.255 When the case made it
to the Supreme Court, the defendant claimed he was entitled, under Brady, to
exculpatory and impeachment evidence in the files, regardless of any state stat-
utory protections. 26 The Supreme Court agreed that Brady reached infor-
mation in these files and remanded the case for the trial court to look for any
252. State v. Peseti, 65 P.3d 119, 134 (Haw. 2003); People v. Foggy, 521 N.E.2d 86, 91
(111. 1988); State v. Robertson, 134 So. 3d 610, 611 (La. Ct. App. 2013); Zaal v. State, 602
A.2d 1247, 1261-62 (Md. 1992); People v. Stanaway, 521 NW.2d 557, 561 (Mich. 1994);
State v. Paradee, 403 NW.2d 640, 642 (Minn. 1987); People v. Davis, 637 N.Y.S.2d 297,
301 (Nassau Cnty, Ct. 1995); City of Dayton v. Turner, 471 N.E.2d 162, 163 (Ohio Ct. App.
1984); State v. Fleischman, 495 P.2d 277, 282 (Or. Ct. App. 1972) ("Nor can the state in-
voke the privilege claim - . . which it attempted to make in the trial court. When the state
chooses to prosecute an individual for crime, it is not free to deny him access to evidence
that is relevant to guilt or innocence, even when otherwise such evidence is or might be priv-
ileged against disclosure." (footnote omitted)); cf Berry v. State, 581 So. 2d 1269, 1275
(Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (describing the privilege protecting the identity of an informant);
Thornton v. State, 231 S.E.2d 729, 733 (Ga. 1977) ("When such an informer's identity is
required under the standards set forth in Brady, the trial court must go further and weigh the
materiality of the informer's identity to the defense against the State's privilege not to dis-
close his name . . ."); In re Crisis Connection, Inc., 949 N.E.2d 789, 800 (Ind. 2011) (dis-
cussing the victim advocate privilege); Goldsmith v. State, 651 A.2d 866, 873 (Md. 1995)
(discussing the psychotherapist-patient privilege).
253. 480 U.S. 39 (1987); see Peseti, 65 P.3d at 134; Foggy, 521 N.B.2d at 91; State v.
Brossette, 634 So. 2d 1309, 1317 (La. Ct, App. 1994); State v. Little, 861 P.2d 154, 158
(Mont. 1993); see also Kirby v. State, 581 So. 2d 1136, 1140 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990).
254. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 43-44.
255. Id. at 43.
256. Id. at 42-43. He also raised confrontation and compulsory-process claims.
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Brady material."' But the Court noted that defendants could not force courts
into such in camera reviews simply by requesting review; rather, the party re-
questing review of the file would have to "establish[] a basis for his claim that
it contains material evidence."258 In short, the Court endorsed threshold re-
quirements for triggering in camera review.
The extent of the showing required to trigger in camera review becomes
quite important in Brady balancing regimes, but courts have not reached con-
sensus on how high that threshold should be. Different states and different priv-
ileges require anything from the showing of a "good faith basis" for the request
to the showing, by "some demonstrable fact, that there is a reasonable probabil-
ity that the records are likely to contain material information necessary to the
defense."259 The benefit of high thresholds, proponents note, is that they make
the files' confidentiality protections meaningful. Without such threshold show-
ings, "in every case a trial judge could become privy to all counseling records
of a sexual assault victim .. . in the absence of any demonstrated need that
would justify such an intrusion."260 The downside of these high thresholds,
however, is that they prevent routine review of the files because the person re-
questing review must already know something about what the files contain be-
fore she can get the court to help find out more. The trouble with not being able
to carry out routine review of the files is that it interferes with the due process
requirement that Brady information be disclosed in all criminal cases.26 1
This general problem with Brady's application to privileged and confiden-
tial information becomes worse in the police personnel file context, for reasons
discussed below.
257. Id. at 61. On remand, the trial court could also instruct defense counsel to review
the files subject to a protective order.
258. 14d. at 58 n.15.
259. People v. Stanaway, 521 N.W.2d 557, 570-71 (Mich. 1994) ("Many [jurisdictions]
require the defendant o make a preliminary showing that the privileged information is likely
to contain evidence useful to his defense."); see, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN, § 41-3-205(2)
(2014) ("Records may be disclosed to a court for in camera inspection if relevant to an issue
before it."); March v. State, 859 P.2d 714, 717-18 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993) ("The proper pro-
cedure to be followed when a party requests discovery of confidential materials is for the
court to conduct an in camera inspection of those materials and then determine which, if
any, are discoverable. . . . As long as the party seeking discovery has a good faith basis for
asserting that the materials in question may lead to the disclosure of favorable evidence, the
trial court should conduct an in camera review before ruling on a request for discovery."),
State ex rel. Romley v. Superior Court (Roper), 836 P.2d 445, 452 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992)
(holding that a victim's medical records statutory privilege is pierced if the trial court finds
the records arc "exculpatory and are essential to presentation of the defendant's theory of the
case, or necessary for impeachment of the victim relevant to the defense theory"); City of
L.A. v. Superior Court (Brandon), 52 P.3d 129, 134 (Cal. 2002); State v. Hutchinson, 597
A.2d 1344, 1347 (Me. 1991) (allowing in camera review upon a showing that "access ...
may be necessary for the determination of any issue before [the court]" (first alteration in
original)).
260. People v. Foggy, 521 N.E.2d 86, 92 (111. 1988).
261. See infra Part IV.C.2.
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B. Why Police Personnel Files Are Different
Police officers are not like other privilege-holding witnesses, and records
of their misconduct do not deserve the same level of protection afforded to
more archetypal privilege holders. This Subpart argues that privacy protections
are not justified for records of police misconduct and that, even if they were,
there would be significant hazards in applying these protections in the context
of Brady, given police officers' special status in the criminal justice system.262
1. Justifications for the privilege
By their nature, evidentiary privileges exclude truthful, relevant infor-
mation that might otherwise aid the court in its truth-seeking efforts. This ex-
clusion is justified in terms of other societal interests. The leading justifications
for the privileges that protect crime victim and crime witness information are
the desire to prevent victims and witnesses from being harmed in the trial pro-
cess by humiliating inquests into sensitive details of their lives and the desire to
encourage future victims and witnesses to participate in the reporting, investi-
gation, and prosecution of crimes.263 These rationales are often employed to
justify the protections for police misconduct records,2 64 but they are ultimately
262. In terms of Wigmore's four requirements for a valid communication privilege, this
Subpart can be seen to attack requirements two and four: that the confidentiality is "essential
to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation" between the communicating parties,
and that "[t]he injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communication
must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation," 8 JOHN
HENRY WrGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 2285, at 527 (John T. McNaugh-
ton ed., 1961) (emphases omitted).
263. E.g., Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 60 ("If [child abuse] records were made available to de-
fendants, even through counsel, it could have a seriously adverse effect on Pennsylvania's
efforts to uncover and treat abuse... . Relatives and neighbors who suspect abuse also will
be more willing to come forward if they know that their identities will be protected."); Davis
v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 319 (1974) ("The State argues that exposure of a juvenile's record
of delinquency would likely cause impairment of rehabilitative goals of the juvenile correc-
tional procedures. This exposure, it is argued, might encourage the juvenile offender to
commit further acts of delinquency, or cause the juvenile offender to lose employment op-
portunities or otherwise suffer unnecessarily for his youthful transgression."); Euphemia B.
Warren, She's Gotta Have It Now: A Qualified Rape Crisis Counselor- Victim Privilege, 17
CARDOZO L. REv. 141, 159-60 (1995) ("Without the critical support counselors provide,
many victims would be unable to report the crime to law enforcement officials, thus perpetu-
ating the low reporting rate of rape." (footnote omitted)).
264. E.g., Martinelli v. Dist. Court, 612 P.2d 1083, 1090 (Colo. 1980) (en banc) (noting
the police concern about "the possible chilling effect of disclosure on the process of procur-
ing such information from citizen-complainants and the possible adverse impact on the com-
plainants of disclosure of their identities," and noting the further police concern that
"knowledge on the part of individual police officers that the information they provide to
S.I.B. investigators will later be subject to disclosure in civil litigation will have a detri-
mental effect on frank and open communication between the officers and the investigators");
State v. Renneke, 563 N.W.2d 335, 339 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) ("For a police officer to face
the continual resurrection of old personnel complaints, no matter how unfounded, every time
he or she makes an arrest leading to criminal charges, is more than a minor embarrassment.
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unpersuasive, especially when used to justify why prosecutors hould not have
access to the personnel files.
It is not hard to see why crime victims and witnesses have greater interests
in protecting sensitive aspects of their lives than police officers do in conceal-
ing their official misconduct. The officer is a public official, invested with great
public trust, and that trust comes with the expectation that the officer will carry
out her duties according to the law and to police department rules. An officer
disciplined for breaking these rules has no right to demand that this discipline
remain private. Indeed, there is a strong societal interest in allowing members
of the public to stay informed of such official misconduct. And that interest is
even stronger when buttressed by a defendant's constitutional rights under
Brady. Of course police officers will be embarrassed by disclosure of their mis-
conduct. But unlike victims and witnesses who are thrust into the spotlight of
the criminal justice system, officers enter this arena voluntarily, and their mis-
conduct-documented by their public employers-does not merit the protec-
tion given to child abuse records or rape crisis counseling communications.
A second rationale for protecting police misconduct is geared more to the
interests of the police department than to those of the particular officer. The
claim is that internal affairs systems would not be able to function if the results
of internal affairs investigations were disclosed. The theory is that citizens
would be afraid to come forward with complaints if they knew their complaints
would not be kept confidential, and officers would be unwillin to report on
their colleagues if they could not be guaranteed confidentiality.26 As one court
explained, the fear is that disclosing internal affairs reports "will have a detri-
mental effect on frank and open communication between the officers and the
investigators."266
Over time, it could become a considerable deterrent to an officer's vigorous enforcement of
the law."), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Underdahl, 767 N.W.2d 677 (Minn.
2009); State ex rel St. Louis Cnty. v. Block, 622 S.W.2d 367, 370-71 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981)
("Here we are faced with a strong need to maintain the confidentiality of the Bureau of In-
ternal Affairs' investigatory files. This confidentiality is essential to protect the integrity of
the police department and to maintain an effective disciplinary system. - . . Witnesses have
been told their interviews were confidential. Systematic disclosure would inhibit officers and
citizens from divulging information in the future."); State v. Kaszubinski, 425 A.2d 711,
712-13 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980) ("Persons charged with the responsibility of con-
ducting the affairs of the police department must be able to rely on confidential information
prepared for internal use. The integrity of this information would be eroded if public expo-
sure were threatened."); People v. Gissendanner, 399 N.E.2d 924, 927 (N.Y. 1979) ("Among
other values the [police disciplinary privilege] is said to serve are the maintenance of police
morale and the encouragement of both citizens and officers to co-operate fully without fear
of reprisal or disclosure in internal investigations into misconduct."),
265. See supra note 264.
266. Martinelli, 612 P.2d at 1090; see Denver Policemen's Protective Ass'n v. Lichten-
stein, 660 F.2d 432, 437 (10th Cir. 1981) ("The [Policemen's Protective] Association asserts
that the government interest in confidentiality is of paramount importance because if they
cannot guarantee confidentiality, citizens and police officers alike will be reluctant to make
statements or likely fail to be completely candid in their statements. They further assert that
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This claim is unavailing for several reasons. First, it overlooks the fact that
many states do make this disci line available, not only to prosecutors and e-
fendants but also to the public. i And there is no evidence that internal affairs
investigations in those jurisdictions have suffered as a result. Second, Ritchie
made clear that, even when it is contained in confidential child abuse files,
Brady material must be disclosed if it can be located.26 8 As a result, internal
affairs investigations cannot guarantee that Brady material will be kept confi-
dential if it is found. The only question is whether the confidentiality should
prevent prosecutors or judges from searching the files without first making
some showing of what the files will contain. Third, as one court noted, officers
who participate in internal affairs investigations must realize that if the investi-
gation finds criminal wrongdoing, the prosecutor will be notified.269 Thus, it
makes little sense to claim that allowing prosecutors to search the files for
Brady material will deter cooperation with internal affairs investigations, be-
cause the participants in these investigations should already know that their
statements could find their way to the ears of a prosecutor.
Two other arguments about disclosure's effects on internal affairs are
worth addressing. First, there may be a fear that greater openness about police
misconduct will invite an avalanche of frivolous complaints, transforming
Brady into an engine for harassing the police. But this fear is overstated. If the
complaints truly are frivolous, they will not result in misconduct findings and
will have vanishingly little effect on an officer's ability to testify. Second, there
is a concern that more liberal disclosure of misconduct will cause departments
to pull back on their internal affairs investigations in order to avoid implicating
an officer's credibility.270 For example, departments might avoid the charge of
"falsifying a police report," choosing instead to call it "failure to follow report-
writing protocols." This type of gamesmanship is certainly possible-and wor-
risome-especially given the benefits to the police department of not losing an
officer to the Brady list. But police departments also have reasons to maintain
vigorous internal affairs systems, both as a means of protecting the integrity of
the police force and as a way of pursuing the Machiavellian management strat-
egies addressed in Part 111. 1 While some departments might rein in their in-
ternal affairs investigations, others would resist doing so, and the possibility of
lack of such statements will impede future investigations and ultimately interfere with the
proper functioning of the police department.").
267. See supra Part II.B.
268. See supra notes 253-58 and accompanying text. The Court even stated that the
"obligation to disclose exculpatory material does not depend on the presence of a specific
request." Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 58 n. 15.
269. Martinelli, 612 P.2d at 1090.
270. Telephone Interview with Richard Lisko, supra note 199; Telephone Interview
with Darrel Stephens, Exec. Dir., Major Cities Chiefs Police Ass'n (Feb. 27,2014),
271. See, e.g., supra notes 203-08 and accompanying text.
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such a negative effect does not seem significant enough to justify the privilege
for police misconduct. 272
In the end, the supposed benefits of making these misconduct findings con-
fidential just do not justify the toll inflicted on defendants' Brady rights.
2. The police officer's special status
The protected status of police personnel files is further complicated by the
police officer's special status as a witness. First, unlike other privilege holders,
officers are both witnesses and members of the prosecution team. The signifi-
cance of the officer's being a member of the prosecution team results from the
prosecutor's duty to learn of favorable information known by others on the
team, including the police.273 Because the officer is part of the team, her
knowledge of the misconduct in these files should be imputed to the prosecutor,
just as the officer's knowledge of any other prosecution witness's credibility
problems would be. No such argument can be made of other privilege holders
who may be victims or witnesses-and may even be friendly to the prosecu-
tion-but are not part of the prosecution team.
Another difference between the officer and the archetypal privilege holder
is the officer's status as a serial witness. The child abuse victim, for example, is
likely to testify in only a single case. Whatever humiliation accrues to him from
the release of privileged information and whatever chilling effect this disclo-
sure has on future child abuse investigations, the disclosure of the information
benefits only the particular defendant in the case. But police officers, as serial
witnesses, may testify in hundreds of cases. If their personnel records are re-
vealed in one case, the disclosure could benefit defendants in hundreds of other
cases. This is one positive externality of disclosing misconduct in a particular
case. The other is that the threat of exposing an officer's misconduct in case af-
ter case will keep prosecutors from using dishonest officers and will help usher
these officers out of the profession.
A final characteristic that makes officer witnesses different from other
privilege-holding witnesses is more basic, albeit harder to prove. Judges and
juries may be predisposed to trust an officer by dint of her position, especially
when her credibility is pitted against the credibility of a criminal defendant.2' 4
If the officer takes the stand with an enhanced reputation for truthfulness, it
would seem perverse to give that credibility an additional boost by allowing the
officer to conceal the type of misconduct that would ordinarily be used to im-
272. Indeed, another incentives story is that disclosing police misconduct will deter
misbehavior within the police force, lessening the load on internal affairs investigators and
allowing them to do more thorough investigations.
273. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995).
274. E.g., David N. Dorfman, Proving the Lie: Litigating Police Credibility, 26 Am. J.
CRIM. L. 455, 472-73 (1999); ROK, Why Does Kopf Believe Cops Most of the Time?,




peach other witnesses. In a well-reasoned dissent, one California Supreme
Court justice complained about this very double standard. "Ironically, jurors are
routinely asked before a trial whether they can judge the credibility of police
officer witnesses the same as any other witness who testifies," the justice wrote.
"Yet the Legislature has enacted a scheme ... that exalts police officers over
all other witnesses who have committed misconduct."2 75
The special status of the police officer witness thus makes it doctrinally
and normatively problematic to protect police misconduct from disclosure.
C. Procedural Problems with Brady Balancing Systems
The discussion above suggests why records of police misconduct should
not receive confidentiality protections. But even if police misconduct deserved
the protected status it currently receives in some jurisdictions, the procedures
used to balance Brady against police privacy are deeply flawed.
Four procedural aspects of these balancing systems are particularly disturb-
ing. First, Brady decisions are made in the abstract by people who lack suffi-
cient knowledge of the facts and the theories of the case to know whether evi-
dence is favorable and material-two of Brady's requirements. Second,
systems that protect the files until judges order them disclosed typically require
threshold showings to trigger in camera review. But these threshold require-
ments prevent Brady's routine application to police personnel files by requiring
prosecutors to know something about what the files contain before the court
will take a look. Third, the process of in camera review exacerbates the conflict
of interest within the prosecution team by allowing officers to make ex parte
communications with the court about the files and by inviting officers into
court to argue against the disclosure of their files-to argue against Brady
compliance. Fourth, even when judges do disclose records of police misconduct
after in camera review, they often do so subject to strict protective orders that
prevent prosecutors from sharing the information with each other or from using
it in future cases involving the officer. These restrictions conflict with Brady's
assumption that a prosecutor has constructive knowledge of anything known by
any other prosecutor in the office. In the end, these procedural flaws lead Brady
balancing systems to shortchange Brady in favor of police confidentiality.
1. Brady decisions made in the abstract
A number of jurisdictions require Brady decisions to be made by people
who have access to the personnel files but lack knowledge of the facts or theo-
ries of the particular criminal case. The problem, doctrinally, is that case-
specific knowledge is required to determine what is and is not Brady material.
Without knowledge of the case, it is impossible to tell what information isfa-
275. City of L.A. v. Superior Court (Brandon), 52 P.3d 129, 149 (Cal. 2002) (Moreno,
J., dissenting).
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vorable and material-two of Brady's three requirements. 276 To assess wheth-
er the evidence is favorable, there has to be some comprehension of how the
defendant would use the evidence in the particular case. To know whether the
evidence is material, there has to be some knowledge of how close the case
is.2 77 What is favorable and material in one case may be neither in the next
case. 218
The Brady-in-the-abstract problem occurs in regimes in which prosecutors
are not allowed to view the personnel records.2 79 In those jurisdictions, police
bureaucrats review the files for potential Brady information and then flag the
files so courts can decide whether the information is, in fact, Brady material,
provided the court actually grants in camera review.280 The police bureaucrat,
however, will struggle to assess favorability and materiality because he knows
nothing of the particular case. In fact, his review of the files takes place long
before there is any case at all. 28 1 And the police reviewer may not have the le-
gal training required to identify what might or might not be useful to the de-
fendant.282 Perhaps it goes without saying, but this behind-the-scenes review
also takes place without any opportunity for defense counsel to argue how the
information-which she does not even know about-would be useful to her
client. All of these factors raise questions about how the police reviewer can
know what qualifies as Brady material.
The Brady-in-the-abstract problem also arises when judges make the Brady
determinations, albeit in an attenuated form. Even though the judge is making
this determination in the context of an actual case, she is not particularly well
placed to say what is and what is not Brady material. That is because the in
camera review takes place significantly before the trial; thus, the specific theo-
ries of the case and the weight of the evidence may not be apparent. Indeed, in
276. See supra Part 1A.
277. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 & n.21, 113 (1976).
278. The special prosecutor who investigated the Justice Department's misconduct in
the Senator Ted Stevens case noted the Brady-in-the-abstract problem: "The review of the
government's files for Brady information was conducted by FBI and IRS agents, some of
whom were unfamiliar with the facts or with Brady/Giglio requirements, unassisted and un-
supervised by the prosecutors." Notice of Filing of Report to Hon. Emmet G. Sullivan, in re
Special Proceedings, No. 09-0198 (EGS) (D.D.C. Mar. 15, 2012), 2012 WL 858523.
279. See supra Part ILA.
280. See supra Parts ILA, II.C.
281. Order Re Brady Motions at 7, People v. Johnson, No. 12029482 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Jan. 7, 2014) ("[W]hile the [Police] Department knows what the officers' personnel files
contain, it lacks knowledge of the facts, circumstances and legal theories of [defendant's]
particular case. Not being trial counsel, the Department cannot ascertain what 'could deter-
mine the trial's outcome."' (quoting City of L.A. v. Superior Court (Brandon), 52 P,3d 129,
138 (Cal. 2002))); Telephone Interview with Daisy Flores, supra note 151 ("Police agencies
typically aren't having an attorney look at the file. It's some clerk. ."); Carter, supra note
200 ("[N]obody in law enforcement knows what sort of misconduct should trigger the addi-
tion of an officer's name to the prosecutor's list,").
282. See Telephone Interview with Daisy Flores, supra note 151.
283. SFPD Disclosure Order, supra note 104.
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some jurisdictions, the judge who makes the Brady decision is a motions judge
who is not even assigned to try the case.2 84 The Brady-in-the-abstract issue also
rears up in jurisdictions in which prosecutors can access the misconduct direct-
ly but instead ask the police to make the first pass through the files to narrow
the search.285
These Brady-in-the-abstract concerns raise questions about whether bal-
ancing systems that rely on such determinations can comply with Supreme
Court doctrine. Granted, the abstract nature of these determinations is not an
insurmountable problem. On the favorability side of the analysis, anything that
undermines the officer's credibility might be deemed favorable.286 And on the
materiality side, the police or court reviewer could just disclose anything even
marginally favorable, thus embracing the Supreme Court's command that pros-
ecutors err on the side of disclosure. But that is not the route these reviewers
have taken, nor would we expect such a liberal approach to disclosure in juris-
dictions in which police confidentiality is so valued.
The irony of the Brady-in-the-abstract problem is that there already exists
someone within the government who is familiar with the facts and the theories
of the case: the prosecutor. It is no coincidence that he prosecutor is the one
the Supreme Court charges with the duty of Brady compliance." While the
prosecutor may lack knowledge of some defense evidence or theory, and while
she may be inclined to shirk her Brady duties, she is at least familiar enough
with the state's case to make an intelligent Brady determination, if she choos-
es.2"' But Brady's application to these files is so politically sensitive that juris-
dictions have elected to send the prosecutor to the sidelines, instead devising
ways to obey Brady without relying on the prosecutor. The problem, as we will
see throughout the following discussion, is that sidelining the prosecutor tam-
pers with the internal logic of Brady, resulting in serious doctrinal problems. 290
2. Threshold requirements for triggering in camera review
The second procedural problem is that the threshold showings required for
in camera review prevent Brady from being routinely applied. In camera review
is an element of three disclosure systems: those in which prosecutors have no
284, E.g., Order Re Brady Motions, supra note 281, at 11.
285. E.g., supra notes 154, 159, 164.
286. This determination would not be easy for exculpatory information, however.
287. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 439 (1995) ("This means, naturally, that a prose-
cutor anxious about tacking too close to the wind will disclose a favorable piece of evi-
dence.").
288. Id.
289. Whether one trusts her to make these determinations responsibly is a legitimate
question, but nonetheless a question distinct from whether she is, doctrinally, the best-placed
person to do so.
290. There is also the fear that the police might not do the review conscientiously.
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access to personnel files, 29 1 those in which prosecutors have access but prefer
to get a court ruling before making disclosure,292 and those in which defend-
ants must seek out Brady information on their own via subpoena.2 93 In all these
systems, the question of what showing is required to trigger in camera review is
critically important because it threatens Brady's routine application. In Califor-
nia, prosecutors cannot trigger in camera review of the files "'without first es-
tablishing a basis for [the] claim that it contains material evidence,' that is evi-
dence that could determine the trial's outcome, thus satisfying the materiality
standard of Brady."2 94 In Colorado, prosecutors must "show how the infor-
mation requested is relevant to the case at issue," and this showing must exceed
"bare allegations that the requested documents would relate to the officer's
credibility."295 These threshold requirements mean the person asking the court
to look for Brady material must already know something about what the file
contains, thus creating a catch-22, 9  The higher the required showing, the less
routinely the search will be performed, and the further Brady drifts from the
Supreme Court's vision of Brady as a self-executing, affirmative obligation that
governs all criminal cases. 297
Further, the threshold requirements create  scaling problem for in camera
review. Police officer testimony is a ubiquitous feature of criminal prosecu-
tions, and any time an officer's testimony is significant to the outcome of the
case, his credibility can become a critical issue. That means courts potentially
face an enormous demand for in camera review of police personnel files.
Courts have some flexibility to raise or lower the bar for triggering in camera
review given that the threshold requirements are defined rather vaguely. But,
while they can get away with lowering the threshold for less common privileg-
es, such as those protecting the child abuse records in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,
they face significant institutional pressure not to lower the bar when it comes to
police personnel files. That is because even a modest lowering of the threshold
could lead to a dramatic increase in the number of reviews the courts are re-
quired to conduct. For example, the California Judges Association recently es-
timated that relaxing the standards for reviewing police personnel files would
cost "tens of thousands of judicial hours" each year in Los Angeles alone.298
291. See supra Part IA.
292. E.g., MARICOPA CNTY. ATT'Y OFFICE, supra note 154, § 6.13; WASH. Ass'N OF
PROSECUTING AT'ys, supra note 159, at 6-7 (explaining that while prosecutors can reveal
information at their discretion, they will generally opt for in camera review first).
293. See, e.g., supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
294. City of L.A. v. Superior Court (Brandon), 52 P.3d 129, 138 (Cal. 2002) (emphasis
omitted) (citation omitted) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 58 n.15 (1987)).
295. People v. Blackmon, 20 P.3d 1215, 1220 (Colo. App. 2000).
296. See supra notes 133-34, 192 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 39, 134 and accompanying text.
298. Letter from Robert A. Glusman, Cal. Judges Ass'n, to Barbara J.R. Jones, Presid-
ing Justice, Cal. Court of Appeal 1 (Feb. 26, 2014) (on file with author).
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And it is not just the increased workload that irks the judiciary. There is an
institutional resentment on the part of judges toward carrying out a duty that
they think should belong to the prosecutor. As the California Judges Associa-
tion wrote:
[J]udges should be available to review specific files and make Brady materi-
ality determinations when close questions are presented . . .. But it is an en-
tirely different matter to newly require the trials courts to review every police
personnel file and make every materialitj determination-a constitutional ob-
ligation that rests with the prosecution.
Indeed, in a recent case, a San Francisco trial judge complained that the fre-
quent demands for in camera Brady review were turning judges into "glorified
paralegals routinely pawing through mounds of documents that could never
'determine the trial's outcome."'
300
In sum, these threshold requirements, which are staples of Brady balancing
systems, pose significant problems for Brady compliance because they prevent
the files from being searched in run-of-the-mill cases. To the extent these
thresholds can be lowered or eliminated, that would ease the doctrinal problems
they pose. But at the same time, these threshold requirements are an essential
safeguard against the judiciary's being crushed by the demand for in camera
review. If courts granted in camera review every time there was a request by
the prosecutor or the defendant, they would be forced either to spend an inordi-
nate amount of time reviewing the files or else to carry out the review so per-
functorily as to make the review worthless. In that sense, the problem is more
profound than just lowering or eliminating the threshold requirements for in
camera review. The problem is that in camera review cannot be carried out on a
large enough scale to ensure that Brady routinely applies to police personnel
files-to ensure that the critical information in these files is located and dis-
closed. 301
299. Id (emphasis added).
300. Order Re Brady Motions, supra note 281, at 11 (quoting City of L.A. v. Superior
Court (Brandon), 52 P.3d 129, 138 (Cal. 2002)). This was the case that led to the recent Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal decision and subsequent California Supreme Court grant of review
discussed in Part IlA. At one point, Judge Richard B. Ulmer remarked that "they used to
trundle these in, in big long carts and just dump it up like a dump cart, and sometimes it
would lap up against the edge of the desk." Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings at 19, Peo-
ple v. Johnson, No. 12029482 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 6, 2014). The Court of Appeal similarly
disapproved of "routinely shifting the responsibility for performing the initial Brady review
from the prosecution to the court." People v- Superior Court (Johnson), 176 Cal. Rptr. 3d
340, 363 n.20 (Ct. App.) ("That allocation of responsibility has long been a fundamental as-
pect of modem constitutional criminal procedure, and it is not to be altered lightly."),
depublished and review granted by 336 P.3d 159 (Cal. 2014). However, that Court of Appeal
decision is no longer citable because of the California Supreme Court's grant of review. See
supra note 112.
301. See Telephone Interview with Scott Durfee, supra note 147 ("[T]he tricky part
about being Brady-qualifying information is that you have to know it exists. You can't make
a representation to the court that this officer has a Brady-qualifying [piece of evidence] in his
file that deserves in camera review without knowing that it's in there. And the only way to
know what's in there is by looking at it.").
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3. Conflicts of interest and ex parte communication
In camera review creates a further procedural problem: it exacerbates the
conflict of interest within the prosecution team over Brady's application to per-
sonnel files. This issue potentially arises in any of the Brady regimes that em-
ploy in camera review. While the prosecutor's constitutional Brady duty is
clear-to disclose favorable, material evidence-the police officer's duty is
more conflicted. As a member of the prosecution team, the officer has a duty to
help the prosecutor comply with Brady. But the officer also has a personal in-
terest in shielding his misconduct from disclosure. In camera review legitimizes
and empowers this personal interest by inviting the officer into court to explain
why his file should not be reviewed by the court and why anything the review
turns up should not be disclosed, By making the officer a party to the case, the
in camera procedure encourages the officer to pursue his own interests in non-
disclosure, even if they conflict with his and the prosecutor's Brady duties. Fur-
ther complicating this procedure is the fact that the officer will typically be rep-
resented in these proceedings by a city attorney whose duty is to pursue the
confidentiality interests of the officer, rather than to ensure Brady compli-
ance.302
This conflict of interest is even more unseemly in light of some of the spe-
cial prerogatives afforded officers and their attorneys. In California, after an in
camera review has been ordered, but before the judge receives the file, the po-
lice officer and her attorney are allowed to remove from the file anything they
deem irrelevant, though they are supposed to be "prepared to state in chambers
and for the record" what they have removed.3 03 This means that the judge does
not review the entire file to make sure Brady information has not been over-
looked or suppressed; she reviews only what the officer and the city attorney
deem relevant. Moreover, California statute permits officers and their designees
to be present in chambers as the court reviews the file, even though prosecu-
tors, defendants, and defense counsel are excluded.30 4 The in camera process
even allows the officer to carry out ex parte communication with the court. A
practice advisory published by the League of California Cities, titled Pitchess
Motions and Brady Disclosures. How Hard Can You/Should You Push Back?,
urges police attorneys, "during the in camera review," to "argue the relevance
of certain complaints and investigation materials contained in the officer's
302. JuL[ CHRISTINE ScoTT, PITCHESS MOTIONS AND BRADY DISCLOSUREs: How HARD
CAN YOU/SHOULD YOU PUSH BACK? 12 (2005) ("It is the city attorney's role in these pro-
ceedings to protect the officers' privacy interests by making sure that the trial courts are well
educated about the law in this area.").
303. People v. Mooc, 36 P.3d 21, 30 (Cal. 2001); Scorr, supra note 302, at 7 ("Defense
attorneys would of course like a general fishing expedition. Limit the Catchl" (italics omit-
ted)).
304. Scorr, supra note 302, at 7 ("Mooc is a great case for several reasons .... It also
reaffirms that neither the defense attorney nor the district attorney are allowed in the in cam-
era proceedings." (italics omitted)).
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file," despite the fact that the other affected parties are not present to dispute
the argument.30 5
To be sure, the officer's conflict of interest would exist independently of
the in camera process, but in camera review makes it worse by granting it legit-
imacy. This conflict raises further concerns about whether balancing systems
that rely on such review are compatible with Brady.
4. Protective orders interfere with constructive knowledge
The final problem with these balancing systems is their use of protective
orders. In California, New Hampshire, Maryland, and elsewhere, protective or-
ders have been used routinely-and to devastating effect-to limit what prose-
cutors and defense attorneys can do with the Brady information that courts do
release from the personnel files. 306 After courts have reviewed the files in cam-
era and disclosed misconduct pursuant to Brady, they often subject these dis-
closures to strict protective orders that prevent prosecutors and defense attor-
neys from alerting their colleagues to an officer's misconduct or using their
own knowledge of the misconduct in future cases involving the officer. These
protective orders undermine Brady's assumption that prosecutors will have
constructive knowledge of and disclose any favorable, material evidence
known to others in the prosecutor's office or on the prosecution team.307
But the information sharing demanded by Brady is precisely what the pro-
tective orders prevent. The problem is pointed enough when protective orders
prevent one prosecutor from telling another prosecutor in the office about an
officer's credibility problems. But the problem borders on the absurd when pro-
tective orders prevent a prosecutor who learns about an officer's credibility
problems in one case from disclosing that information in future cases involving
305. Id. at 9-10; see also JUL C. Scocr, FUNDAMENTALS OF OPPOSING MOTIONS FOR
DISCOVERY OF PEACE OFFICER PERSONNEL RECORDS (PITCHESS MOTIONS) 12 (2012) ("[B]e
prepared to argue the relevance of the materials you do bring at the in camera, although
some judges are uncomfortable with this." (italics omitted)).
306. Memorandum from Peter W. Heed, supra note 115; see also Reply in Support of
Request to Stay & Order Trial at 3, People v. Superior Court (Johnson), 176 Cal. Rptr. 3d
340 (Ct. App. 2014) (Nos. A140767, A]40768) ("Case law makes clear that the protective
order should specify that disclosure is limited to the present case. . . .'; SCOrT, supra note
305, at 14 ("Your protective order should of course . . . require the destruction of any copies
and return of originals upon conclusion of the case." (italics omitted)); Kevin Heade, Are
Brady Materials Limited by Protective Orders?, FOR THE DEFENSE (Maricopa Cnty. Pub. De-
fender's Office, Phx., Ariz.), Nov. 2011 -Jan. 2012, at 7, 7 (reproducing the text of a protec-
tive order); Telephone Interview with Edie Cimino, Felony Trial Att'y, Office of the Pub.
Defender, Balt., Md. (May 19, 2014).
307. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 438 (1995) ("[N]o one doubts that police in-
vestigators sometimes fail to inform a prosecutor of all they know. But neither is there any
serious doubt that 'procedures and regulations can be established to carry [the prosecutor'sl
burden and to insure communication of all relevant information on each case to every lawyer




the same officer. In such a situation, the prosecutor has actual knowledge of
misconduct that the Constitution requires her to disclose, but the trial court's
protective order requires her to keep the information secret. It is not just a mat-
ter of having the prosecutor take her knowledge from the earlier case and pre-
sent it to the judge as good cause justifying in camera review. The prosecutor is
not even permitted to use the protected information to make the good cause
showing in the new case.308 And, as noted above, the threshold showing for in
camera review can be quite challenging. If the judge refuses to order in camera
review in the new case, the prosecutor will have actual knowledge of what the
file contains and a certainty that it qualifies as Brady material, but will have no
ability to alert the defense. 09
This is not just a hypothetical problem.3 10 In the San Francisco Brady case
discussed earlier, prosecutors had actual knowledge that the "key" police of-
ficer witnesses had more than 500 pages of Brady material in their personnel
files. 311 Prosecutors knew this, according to their appellate brief, because "they
received that material after in camera review in prior cases. But they are for-
bidden by protective orders in those cases from using that information in any
subsequent case."3 12 Despite this knowledge on the part of the prosecutors, the
judge refused to order in camera review because the prosecutors, hampered by
the protective order, could not specify how the information in the personnel
files would satisfy Brady's materiality standard.313
This San Francisco case, with prosecutors who knew of the misconduct but
were bound to silence, illustrates the conflict between these protective orders
and Brady. But even where the prosecutor does not have actual knowledge of
the officer's misconduct, the protective orders are problematic because they
prevent prosecutors in the same office from sharing Brady information, despite
the doctrine's demands that they do so.3 14
308. See supra Part iV.B.
309. Of course, the prosecutor could avoid the problem by dropping the charges.
310. See supra notes 107-08, 300 and accompanying text, In addition, Baltimore public
defenders are challenging protective orders that prevent Brady sharing. "[The protective or-
der] says I'm not supposed to be able to talk about the disclosure with anybody who does not
have a direct functional responsibility on this case," said Edie Cimino, a public defender in
Baltimore. "I can't be Chinese-walled away from my supervisory chain and my trial team
who don't have direct functional responsibility" in the case. Telephone Interview with Edie
Cimino, supra note 306. "How are we supposed to forget the information after one case, and
let the agent go on to the next investigation without informing those prosecutors?" one fed-
eral prosecutor asked. "If the agent is removed from this district because of a Henthorn prob-
lem and is transferred to Nevada, do we have an obligation to inform Nevada? It's not Brady
yet, but it may be if the prosecutor there gets a Henthorn request." Wiehl, supra note 71, at
118.
311. SFPD Brief, supra note 104, at 19, 23, 36 n.4.
312. Id. at 36 n.4 (citation omitted).
313. Order Re Brady Motions, supra note 281, at 6-7.
314. See supra note 307 and accompanying text.
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Beyond the particular procedural faults, the overarching problem with
these balancing systems is the negligence they endorse toward Brady's applica-
tion to police personnel files. Prosecutors, judges, and defendants remain in the
dark about what these files contain, and the balancing systems are all too will-
ing to let the ignorance persist, despite the great potential of these files to con-
tain Brady material. The problem is that the courts are made the gatekeepers of
the Brady material in the files, but prosecutors or defendants must know some-
thing about what the files contain before the courts will help ensure Brady ma-
terial is not being suppressed. The requirements for intervention by the courts
are little help in discovering impeachment material hidden in the many confi-
dential files about which nothing happens to be known. The impeachment evi-
dence contained in those files is thus allowed to go unexamined and undis-
closed.
Indeed, when it comes to police personnel files, the systematic failure of
these Brady balancing systems is their failure to be systematic-their failure to
allow for the routine search of these files for critical impeachment evidence.
This failure to learn of impeachment evidence is all the more troubling because
it is the product of an effort to accommodate an interest-police officer confi-
dentiality-that does not make sense as a matter of policy. These privacy pro-
tections allow dishonest officers to continue to testify and, as a result, to hold
on to their jobs.
In the end, the problem is that police officers do not deserve confidentiality
protections for their misconduct, and even if they do, the systems that purport
to balance Brady against these privacy protections are incompatible with core
tenets of the Brady doctrine.
V. SOLUTIONS
The root causes of Brady violations stretch far beyond prosecutors, at least
when it comes to evidence of police misconduct. In jurisdictions where police
departments withhold information from prosecutors, where courts refuse to
look in the personnel files, or where prosecutors have access to impeachment
material but do not disclose it, Brady violations result from an undeserved so-
licitude for police confidentiality. Whether by statute, by policy, or by political
pressure, police personnel files have taken on a protected status that allows
those who are inclined to suppress evidence of police misconduct to do so, not
as rogue actors, but with the imprimatur of the state. This broad-based respon-
sibility for Brady violations undermines the standard account of such violations
as creatures of prosecutorial cheating. It also suggests that the standard Brady
solutions-increasing punishment for prosecutors, increasing court oversight of
the Brady disclosure process, and mandating "open file" policies-may have
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little effect on the suppression of personnel file evidence because prosecutors
are often not the ones in control."
Because the causes of Brady violations go beyond prosecutors, so must the
solutions. The most elegant solution to the Brady problems discussed in this
Article would be to make records of police misconduct accessible to the public.
Public access would both facilitate defendants' access to the information and
relieve prosecutors of the hassle of learning of and disclosing the information.
If the information were public, a reasonably diligent defendant would be able to
access it and the information would thus fall outside the sweep of Brady.3 1 6
Despite its virtues, however, this public-access solution is unlikely to succeed
because it would face enormous political resistance from those who support po-
lice officer confidentiality and because it goes beyond what is needed to ad-
dress the Brady problem. As far as Brady is concerned, police officers can keep
their files secret from the public, so long as this confidentiality does not impede
prosecutors' access.
Short of making police misconduct records public, there are a number of
potential solutions. First, and most importantly, jurisdictions should acknowl-
edge that the personnel files must be searched in every case in which an of-
ficer's testimony could prove significant to the trial's outcome, even if the de-
fendant fails to request such a search. Brady imposes a self-executing,
affirmative obligation on the prosecution to seek out any favorable information
known to other members of the prosecution team, and the officers on the prose-
cution team certainly know about the misconduct contained in these files.3 17
This knowledge should be imputed to the prosecutor, just as officers' knowl-
edge of an informant's credibility problems would be.
While there is debate about how far this constructive knowledge extends-
whether it includes credibility evidence contained in divorce proceedings or
high school report cards, for example" 3 -it is not necessary to establish the
outer limit of the prosecutor's duty to learn in order to see that the personnel
files fall within it.3 19 An explicit holding by the courts-the higher, the bet-
ter-that these personnel files must be searched in all federal and state prosecu-
tions would help clarify the law on this point.
However, even if a defense request is required to trigger a prosecutor's
search obligations, state laws and local policies should not impede the prosecu-
tor from looking at the file herself The systems that create such impediments
wind up undermining the Brady doctrine. As argued throughout the Article, the
315. See supra note 19; see also CONVICTION INTEGRITY PROJECT, Supra note 171, at 23;
Bennett L. Gershman, Litigating Brady v. Maryland: Games Prosecutors Play, 57 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 531, 531 (2007).
316. See supra Part II.B.
317. See supra notes 39, 134 and accompanying text
318. See United States v. Robinson, 627 F.3d 941, 946 (4th Cir. 2010); Breedlove v.
Moore, 279 F.3d 952, 956 (11th Cir. 2002); People v. Garrett, 18 N.E.3d 722, 731-32 (N.Y.
2014).
319. See supra Part L..
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prosecutor is the only one, other than the defendant, who knows enough about
the facts and theories of the case to make the Brady determinations. Jurisdic-
tions that sideline the prosecutor by denying him access to the files end up
foisting the Brady duty on police bureaucrats and judges, neither of whom are
institutionally capable of carrying out this obligation on the scale required to
routinely apply Brady to personnel files.
While prosecutors may delegate the initial search of the files to police re-
viewers, they should provide clear guidance to ensure that these reviewers flag
all favorable credibility evidence, regardless of its perceived materiality, given
that the materiality determinations cannot be made in the abstract.32 0 In addi-
tion, prosecutors should sometimes review the files directly, even if they dele-
gate the bulk of the searching to the police. This threat of direct review, though
rarely carried out, would help deter police reviewers from suppressing Brady
information. As it currently stands, police reviewers in some jurisdictions can
withhold information from the files without fear that prosecutors will ever find
out, because prosecutors have no ability to check the reviewers' work.
For jurisdictions that insist on delegating the search of the files to judges,
despite the judiciary's institutional inadequacies, the procedural problems dis-
cussed in Part IV must be taken into account. Courts should lower or eliminate
the threshold showings required to trigger in camera review. Whatever addi-
tional work is created could be partially offset by reducing the use of protective
orders. This reduction would allow prosecutors to share Brady material with
other prosecutors and with defense counsel, without requiring a fresh in camera
review each time a Brady officer appears as a witness. In general, courts should
be very leery of issuing protective orders for misconduct evidence that will
likely be significant in future cases involving the officer. Where courts insist on
protective orders, these orders should at least permit prosecutors to share this
information with others in their office, thus aligning protective-order practices
with Brady's constructive knowledge doctrine.
Beyond the systemic changes discussed above, there are ways that defend-
ants, prosecutors, and individual judges can attack this problem on a case-by-
case basis. Defendants could file motions asking courts to require prosecutors
to certify that they have checked police witnesses' personnel files for Brady
material. Or prosecutors who were so inclined could refuse to use the testi-
mony of any officer who does not make her personnel file available, thus pres-
suring the officer into waiving any privilege she has over the records.2 Simi-
320. E.g., United States v. Herring, 83 F.3d 1120, 1121 (9th Cir. 1996).
321. In North Carolina, in the wake of a junk-science scandal at the state crime lab, de-
fense attorneys have demanded prosecutors certify that they checked the lab technicians'
files for anything that would undermine their testimony. See Sample Motion to Disclose Re-
sults of Certification Exam (n.d.) (on file with author); see also Jason Kreag, The Brady Col-
loquy, 67 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 47 (2014), http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/default
/files/online/articles/67_Stan_L_RevOnline_47_Kreag.pdf
322. Obviously, though, this would add friction to the relationship between prosecutors
and officers. See Becerrada v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. Rptr. 3d 735, 739 (Ct. App. 2005)
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larly, a trial judge who is frustrated with routinely reviewing personnel files
could opt for a jury instruction explaining to the jury that the officer would not
provide prosecutors with access to the officer's personnel file and that the jury
is free to draw whatever inferences it chooses from that refusal.3
Many variations on the above solutions are possible, but the core problem
remains. Brady's application to these personnel files threatens the interests of
the police, a powerful and influential constituency. There are systems that
could be employed to mollify police concerns on the margins. For instance,
states could enact statutes like those in California and Maryland that would
prevent police departments from basing disciplinary action on a prosecutor's
decision to put an officer on the Brady list.324 This would not address the prob-
lem that prosecutors can add officers to the Brady list for inappropriate reasons,
but it would at least prevent the officers from suffering employment conse-
quences as a result.
Nonetheless, even with such employment protections, there are many rea-
sons to believe that officers and their advocates will continue to resist Brady's
application to these files and, thus, little reason to expect a lessening in the ten-
sions between Brady and police officer confidentiality provisions. What is ul-
timately required to address the core problem is for prosecutors, courts, legisla-
tors, and the electorate to prioritize the demands of Brady over the interests of
the police. And that is a lot to ask.
CONCLUSION
Systems that balance officers' confidentiality interests against Brady's con-
stitutional requirements get it completely wrong. These protections benefit dis-
honest cops by allowing them to testify and, thus, to continue to work the
streets. Meanwhile, these protections harm defendants, who are denied critical
impeachment evidence to which they are entitled under Brady. And they harm
society by undermining due process and by allowing dishonest officers to stay
on the job. More liberal rules for disclosing records of misconduct would im-
prove Brady compliance and help cleanse police departments of tainted offic-
ers.
("The recognition by the Supreme Court that an officer remains free to discuss with the
prosecution any material in his files, in preparation for trial, means that the officer practically
may give to the prosecution that which it could not get directly."); Application of the Appel-
late Committee of the California District Attorneys Association for Leave to File Amicus
Curiae Brief in Support of Petitioner at 9, People v. Superior Court (Johnson), 176 Cal. Rptr.
3d 340 (Ct. App. 2014) (Nos. A140767, A140768).
323. Cf Jones, supra note 19, at 450-52 (urging a Brady jury instruction for intentional-
ly withheld evidence); Robert Weisberg, Note, Defendant v. Witness: Measuring Confronta-
lion and Compulsory Process Rights Against Statutory Communications Privileges, 30
STAN. L. REv. 935, 983 (1978) (proposing a jury instruction for cases in which an evidentiary
privilege is used to exclude potentially exculpatory or impeaching material).
324. See supra Part III.B.2.
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This Article has sought to explain how Brady developed a blind spot when
it comes to evidence in police personnel files. The story involves a combination
of decisions at all levels of government and the courts. The Supreme Court's
case law set up a far-ranging but ill-defined obligation to seek out and disclose
Brady material. By its terms, this obligation encompasses information known to
members of the prosecution team but unrelated to the case, such as the contents
of the personnel files. But this doctrinal requirement was, just as surely, not
created with such unrelated-case material in mind. For their part, the lower fed-
eral courts have not clearly articulated how Brady should apply to evidence of
misconduct contained in police personnel files. That is largely because they
have not been required to, in light of the Justice Department's Brady policy and
the effects of AEDPA.
In the absence of federal case law, states have been left alone to navigate
between the statutes, policies, and institutional pressures opposing disclosure,
on the one hand, and Brady's doctrinal demands for disclosure, on the other.
This has resulted in a wide variety of Brady practices around the country and
has led to defendants' losing the protections of Brady simply by virtue of where
they happen to be tried.
From state to state and county to county, the excuses for failing to search
the personnel files are varied, persistent, and unliersuasive. There is little prac-
tical justification for this failure. Nor is there a doctrinal justification. The anal-
ogies to Pennsylvania v. Ritchie and other cases balancing Brady against evi-
dentiary privileges do not stand up to scrutiny because police officers are not
like other privilege holders. Systems that purport to balance officers' privacy
rights with defendants' Brady rights wind up giving short shrift to Brady. The
division within the prosecution team has only added to the difficultly in apply-
ing Brady to these files, with officers claiming Brady threatens their own due
process rights.
The cumulative effect of all these impediments is that personnel files and
all the impeachment material they contain are often ignored with impunity. In
too many places, the belief persists that these files can go unexamined without
violating Brady-that these files are somehow beyond the reach of the Brady
doctrine. This view lacks firm footing in good law or good policy, and the
sooner it is discarded, the better.
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